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ABSTRACT
RUCHITA MANGHNANI: Firms and Technology in International Trade: Analysis of Indian
Firms.
(Under the direction of Patrick Conway)
The dissertation studies firms and technology in International Trade using data from India. In
the first paper, I examine the relationship between exports and productivity. I control for firm
variation in prices and retrieve measures of firm productivity. I compute within firm changes in
productivity from entering into export markets and decompose gains to productivity from export
market entry into two channels- the imports of intermediate inputs and investment in R & D. In
the second paper (with Ivan Kandilov and Asli Leblebicioglu), we examine the impact of trade
liberalization on investment in imported capital goods. We distinguish between tariffs on capital
goods, intermediate inputs and final goods and examine three channels through which reduction in
tariffs can impact investment in imported capital goods.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The dissertation falls within the broad area of Firms and Technology in International Trade:
Analysis of Indian Firms. The dissertation consists of two essays:
1. Exports and Productivity: The Role of Imported Inputs and Investment in R & D
2. Trade Liberalization and Investment in Foreign Capital Goods
There are some common features to the analysis of the two essays. The essays use the firm-level
theory of choices in the context of international trade. Essay 1 uses the choices of participating in
export markets, import of intermediate inputs and investment in R & D to augment the productivity
of the firm. Essay 2 models the dynamic decision of investment in foreign capital goods. Both
essays involve the use of econometric panel-data analysis.
The firm level dataset used in both the essays is the CMIE - Prowess, a panel dataset of Indian
firms. In addition to the variables included in most firm level datasets, the dataset also has informa-
tion on foreign exchange transactions (imports and exports by the firm), which makes it suitable to
explore answers to the questions asked in the two essays. Among the largest emerging economies,
India provides an interesting setting to study the questions asked.
In the first essay, I ask if firms become more productive after they enter into export markets.
And if so, what are the mechanisms through which firms improve productivity? While trade theory
predicts within-firm improvements in productivity related to exports, empirical research has largely
failed to identify these gains. Empirical work in the export-productivity literature has, for the most
part, used measures of revenue productivity that do not account for pricing heterogeneity across
firms.
In my analysis, I control for firm variation in prices by constructing firm specific price deflators.
I measure quantity from data on firm revenues using these deflators rather than the traditional
industry level price deflator that is generally used in the literature. I explicitly model imports of
intermediate inputs and firm R & D into the production function. Most exporters are also importers
of intermediate inputs. This export-import complementarity has largely been ignored in the export-
productivity literature. While theoretical models emphasize the the market size - investment in R
& D route to productivity improvements through export market entry, there is little known on the
R & D-productivity link in developing countries.
I estimate the production function parameters using proxy estimators for manufacturing firms
using data for the period 1989 − 2005. I compute within firm productivity changes from export
entry using a DID-matching estimator. I find that over a six year period, the difference in produc-
tivity growth between export entrants and their non-exporter counterparts is about 11 percentage
points. I find that productivity improvements from selling in international markets have largely
been understated in the export-productivity empirical literature. I decompose this difference in
productivity growth into two channels. I show that about 15 percent of this difference in productiv-
ity growth is explained by higher imports of intermediate inputs and about 85 percent is explained
by investment in R & D. The evidence suggests that investment in R & D is an important source of
within firm productivity gains even in developing countries.
In the second essay (co-authored with Ivan T. Kandilov and Aslı Leblebiciog˘lu), we evaluate
the impact of trade liberalization on firm’s decision to invest in foreign capital goods. We estimate
dynamic investment equations using the system-GMM estimator. Using input-output tables, we
construct separate tariffs on capital goods, intermediate inputs and final goods, and control for
them simultaneously in our estimations. This allows us to identify the direct effect of lower prices
of foreign capital goods as a result of reduction in tariffs on firm investment in imported capital
goods.
The previous work on trade and investment have largely been cross country or industry-level
studies which have analyzed the impact of output tariff reductions on aggregate investment. The
firm-level studies have treated all investment as domestic investment. By separating investment in
foreign capital goods from investment in domestic capital goods, we are able to examine the impact
of trade liberalization on investment in foreign capital goods which are imported from a handful
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of developed countries. This relates to the literature on trade liberalization and productivity as we
are able to examine one mechanism through which trade liberalization could have contributed to
productivity improvements - through the transfer of R & D-intensive capital goods.
Consistent with theory, we find that a reduction in import protection on capital goods and in-
termediate inputs led to higher firm-level investment in foreign capital goods, whereas reductions
in output tariffs resulted in lower investment. We also find that the effects of lower capital goods
and intermediate input tariffs were more pronounced for exporters. Firms in the middle range of
the productivity distribution benefited the most from reductions in capital goods tariffs. Moreover,
we find that following reductions in output tariffs, firms with greater market power lowered in-
vestment in foreign capital goods more aggressively and firms in industries with scope for product
differentiation and quality upgrading lowered investment less. We show that the investment rate in
foreign capital goods increased by 62.31 percent as a result of trade liberalization.
3
CHAPTER 2
EXPORTS AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ROLE OF IMPORTED INPUTS AND INVESTMENT
IN R & D
2.1 Introduction
In the past few decades, countries across the world have lifted barriers to trade. More firms are
now selling their products to global markets while also purchasing inputs from across the world.
In India, the number of manufacturing firms reporting positive exports rose from less than 600
in 1989 to about 2500 in the year 2005.1 At the same time, there have been vast differences in
productivity documented across firms. Firms in the 90th percentile have been found to be almost
twice as productive as firms in the 10th percentile in several countries including India, China and
the U.S.2 Given the increasing global nature of production, there is a need to understand the role
of trade in explaining these vast differences in productivity across firms. This is also important
from a policy point of view. If firms improve productivity through exports, there may be a case for
export promotion policies by governments to lower entry costs into export markets and encourage
exports.
Theoretical models of trade argue that the relationship between exports and productivity should
be potentially bidirectional, i.e., both that more productive firms will begin to export and that
becoming an exporter makes a firm more productive. Melitz (2003b) models self selection of more
productive firms into export markets due to a fixed cost of entry into export markets, while Bustos
(2011b), Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Melitz and Costantini (2007) emphasize export-technology
complementarity, where access to larger markets through entry into export markets allows firms to
invest in innovative activities and thus improve productivity. Empirical studies have documented
1These numbers are based on public firms, which are legally required to report foreign exchange transactions.
2See Syverson (2004) for the U.S and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for China and India
a positive correlation between productivity and export participation. While there is substantial
evidence that the more productive firms self-select into exporting, the evidence on whether firms
improve productivity post entry into export markets is not so clear cut.3
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence (on firms becoming more productive after
they begin exporting) could be that previous studies have usually estimated revenue productivity
based on industry level average prices rather than firm-specific prices. If firms improve productivity
and pass this on to consumers in the form of lower prices, revenue-based measures using industry
price deflators will not capture the improvements in productivity.4 Recent work by Marin and
Voigtlander (2013) on Chile suggests that this could be the reason why empirical studies have
not been able to find evidence of firms improving productivity after they begin exporting. They
compare revenue based measures of productivity that are typically used with marginal costs and
find that while firms do not become more productive, as measured by revenue productivity, they
do become more efficient as measured by marginal costs, post entry into export markets.5
This finding on Chile has highlighted the need to correct for biases that arise from revenue
based measures of productivity calculated on the basis of average prices for the industry to under-
stand the relationship between exports and productivity. The dataset I use in this paper contains
information on firm prices and allows me to recover measures of physical productivity that account
for variation in prices across firms.6 In this paper I ask, do firms become more productive after
3Several empirical papers have confirmed that more productive firms self select into export markets. For example,
see Delgado, Farias, and Ruano (2002) and Bernard and Jensen (1999). Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller (2004)
reviews ten papers and finds widespread evidence of the self selection hypothesis. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998),
Arnold and Hussinger (2005) and Greenaway, Gullstrand, and Kneller (2005) find that exporting does not improve
productivity. This also holds for evidence from fourteen countries presented in ISGEP (2008). Notable exceptions
which have found evidence of improvements in productivity post entry into export markets include De Loecker (2007)
and Biesebroeck (2005).
4Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) use data on physical quantities of a few homogeneous industries in the
US and find a negative correlation between price and efficiency. More productive firms charge lower prices and there
is wider variation across firms in physical productivity as compared to revenue productivity.
5Smeets and Warzynski (2013) estimate value added production functions using firm price deflators and find that
these yield higher trade premia in Danish firms as compared to revenue based measures.
6While most empirical work ignores price variation, there are a few exceptions. They control for unobserved prices
by modeling demand under the assumptions of single product monopolistically competitive firms. Aside from the fact
that they usually assume that firms produce only a single product, monopolistic competition implies a optimal price
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they enter into export markets? And if so, what are the mechanisms through which firms improve
productivity? I examine the role of two possible mechanisms - imports of intermediate inputs and
investment in R & D.
A large number of firms are two-way traders i.e., they export final goods while also importing
intermediate inputs. An Indian manufacturing firm that exports its products is five times more
likely than a non-exporter to also be an importer of intermediate inputs. If firms import intermedi-
ate inputs from abroad to improve productivity and reduce marginal costs of production, when im-
ports are not accounted for, differences in measured productivity could possibly be reflecting these
differences in the use of imported intermediate inputs across firms. This export-import complemen-
tarity, where access to export markets allows firms to pay the fixed costs of importing intermediate
inputs and thus improve productivity, has largely been ignored in the export-productivity literature.
The export-technology complementarity has been emphasized in theoretical models such as Melitz
and Costantini (2007) where access to larger markets allows firms to pay the fixed cost of R & D.
I examine the relative contributions of these two channels to productivity improvements of export
starters.7
I use CMIE Prowess, a panel data set of manufacturing firms from India. I first recover the
parameters of the production function by explicitly including imported intermediate inputs and
investment in R & D within the production function of the firm while also taking into account
heterogeneity in firm prices. I use proxy methods as suggested by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
(2015) to estimate the production function parameters. Once I have my measure of productivity,
I then use a difference-in-differences matching estimator as proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and
where prices are a constant markup over marginal costs where the markup ratio is determined by the elasticity of
demand in the industry and is assumed to be the same for all firms in the industry. I observe in the data that a large
proportion of the firms are multiproduct firms. The advantage of directly observing product level revenue and price
data is that I can directly control for price heterogeneity without making these assumptions.
7There is a literature on export-related productivity improvements through Learning by Exporting. Firms often
get direct technology transfers from foreign buyers they sell to. Also, similar to the Learning by Doing framework of
Arrow (1962) where learning takes place through activity, as firms in developing countries begin to cater to competitive
export markets where consumers are more demanding, they face challenges which might require them to improve
quality, upgrade technology as well as management techniques, all of which result in productivity improvements. See
Fernandes and Isgut (2015) for a discussion on Learning by Exporting.
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Todd (1997) to examine whether firms improve productivity when they begin to export and the
relative importance of the two channels (imports and investment in R & D).
The paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, I use a measure of produc-
tivity that captures physical productivity, which does not suffer from the drawbacks of productivity
measures that are generally used in the trade-productivity literature. I do so by measuring output
from firm revenues and firm prices rather than industry prices, as is typically done. Second, I ex-
plicitly model both imports of intermediate inputs and R & D into the production function. This
allows me to examine two mechanisms for productivity improvement and to decompose gains to
productivity from export entry into these two channels. Third, I use data on firms from India.
This country provides an interesting setting to study this question. While theoretical models em-
phasize the market size - investment in technology route to productivity improvements through
export market entry, most of the world R & D takes place in developed nations. In 2011, seven
countries accounted for 72 percent of global R & D spending.8 There is little known on the R &
D-productivity link in developing countries.
The results suggest that productivity improvements from selling in international markets have
largely been understated in the export-productivity empirical literature. After accounting for firm
pricing heterogeneity, I find that over a six year period, the difference in productivity growth be-
tween export entrants and their non exporter counterparts is about 11 percentage points. The
estimates indicate that about 15 percent of the differences in productivity growth is explained by
imports of intermediate inputs, while investment in R & D explains about 85 percent of this dif-
ference in productivity growth. Thus, investment in R & D is an important driver of productivity
growth even in developing countries like India.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the environment the firm
operates in and the production technology of the firm. Section 2.4 presents the empirical production
function where I discuss the measure of productivity that is used. Section 2.5 is on the estimation
strategy employed. Section 2.6 describes the data. I discuss the findings in Section 2.7 and Section
8National Science Board. 2014. Science and Engineering Indicators 2014. Arlington VA: National Science Foun-
dation (NSB 14-01)
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2.8 concludes.
2.2 The Environment
Each firm i produces output (Qit) using capital (Kit), labor (Lit), intermediate inputs (Xit) and
energy inputs (Eit) in period t. The firm has a Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function with a
nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function for intermediate inputs.
Qit = e
ωitKαkit L
αl
it E
αe
it X
αx
it (2.1)
where eωit is the productivity of the firm. The intermediate input bundle is a CES aggregator of
horizontally differentiated material inputs similar to Gopinath and Neiman (2014).9 The input
varieties are imperfect substitutes for each other and the aggregate input bundle is increasing in the
number of varieties employed in production.10 The intermediate input bundle is a CES aggregator
of a bundle of domestic intermediate inputs (Xdit) and a bundle of imported intermediate inputs
(Xfit).
Xit = [X
ρ
dit +X
ρ
fit]
1
ρ (2.2)
The elasticity of substitution between the domestic input bundle and the imported input bundle
is given by 1
1−ρ , where 0 < ρ < 1. Firm i’s use of domestic variety h is represented by dhit and
use of foreign variety a is represented by fait. Ht is the number of of input varieties available
domestically within the country, Nt is the number of varieties available in the rest of the world and
nit ≤ Nt is the number of foreign inputs imported by firm i. The domestic input bundle and the
imported input bundle are again CES aggregators of domestically available varieties and imported
9Intermediate inputs are commonly modeled as CES functions in the trade and growth literature. See Ethier (1982),
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013).
10An alternate approach in the growth literature has been that of quality ladder type models where intermediate
inputs are vertically differentiated (See Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Chapter 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991)).
The dataset used in the paper does not have information about firm specific actual varieties and prices of imported
materials. This makes it difficult to make inferences about the quality of imports. The horizontally differentiated
varieties framework allows me to derive an expression relating varieties to import intensity (observed in the data)
to use in the production function. Moreover, empirical evidence points to the importance of the extensive margin or
number of varieties in imports. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), using HS6 level data on imports
into India, find that between 1987 and 2000, the extensive margin (varieties not imported in 1987) accounted for over
67 percent of the growth of imported intermediates in India.
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varieties of intermediate inputs respectively.
Xdit = [
Ht∑
h=1
dθhit]
1
θ (2.3)
Xfit = [
nit∑
a=1
f θait]
1
θ (2.4)
Note that while Ht is common to all firms, nit is sub-scripted by i. This is because the number
of varieties of inputs imported from abroad varies across firms since the firm pays a fixed cost
of importing each variety of the foreign intermediate input. The elasticity of substitution within
domestic varieties and also within foreign varieties is 1
1−θ , where 0 < θ < 1.
The law of motion for evolution of Capital Stock is given by
Kit = (1− δ)Kit−1 + Iit−1 (2.5)
where δ is the per period depreciation rate of capital stock and Iit−1 is the firm investment in
physical capital made in period t− 1. Physical investment enters into the production process with
a lag. Thus, the investment made in t− 1 enters capital stock in period t. This is the time to build
assumption commonly used in models of physical capital accumulation (For example, see Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)).
I assume that productivity evolves over time as a Markov process, similar to Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013) and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011). The firm can invest in R & D in period t− 1
to improve productivity in t.11 In period t− 1, the firm expects that its productivity in period t will
be g(ωit−1, dkit−1) where d
k
it−1 is the discrete decision to engage in R & D in period t− 1.
g(ωit−1, dkit−1) = E(ωit|ωit−1, dkit−1) (2.6)
11Recent empirical work on productivity estimation has endogenized the productivity evolution process by explicitly
modeling factors that could impact productivity. See for example, see De Loecker (2011), De Loecker (2013), Boler,
Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (ming)
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The expected productivity g(ωit−1, dkit−1) is increasing in d
k
it−1 i.e.,
E(ωit|ωit−1, dkit−1 = 1)− E(ωit|ωit−1, dkit−1 = 0) > 0 (2.7)
The Markovian assumption implies that
ωit = g(ωit−1, dkit−1) + ζit (2.8)
In period t, the actual realized productivity is ωit and it can be decomposed into expected produc-
tivity g(ωit−1, dkit−1) and a random shock ζit, which represents the deviation of realized productivity
from the firm’s expectation. It is a mean zero i.i.d shock and captures the stochastic nature of pro-
ductivity evolution. It is not anticipated by the firm in period t − 1 and is, by construction, mean
independent of ωit−1 and dkit−1. I assume the specific functional form:
ωit = γ1ωit−1 + γ2dkit−1 + γ3ωit−1 ∗ dkit−1 + ζit (2.9)
I expect γ2 to be positive. I include an interaction term between firm level productivity and the
firm’s decision to invest in R&D to allow for differences in productivity gains for firms investing in
R & D depending on their initial productivity levels. ζit is the i.i.d error term as mentioned above.
From the production technology specified, the short run marginal cost function is
MCit =
[
β
eωitKαkit
Qit
1−αvwtαlutαePxitαx
] 1
αv
(2.10)
where β = α−αll α
−αe
e α
−αx
x and αv = αl + αe + αx. The price of labor inputs is wt, the price of
energy inputs is ut and Pxit is the price of the intermediate input bundle of firm i in period t. The
price of the intermediate input bundle, Pxit is a CES aggregator of the price index of the domestic
intermediate input bundle (Pdt) and the price index of the imported intermediate bundle (Pfit).
Pxit = [P
ρ
ρ−1
dt + P
ρ
ρ−1
fit ]
ρ−1
ρ (2.11)
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The price index of the domestic intermediate input bundle is a CES aggregator of the prices of
the Ht domestic varieties where pdht is the price of domestic variety h in period t.
Pdt =
[
Ht∑
h=1
pdht
θ
θ−1
] θ−1
θ
(2.12)
The price index of the domestic input bundle is identical for all firms since all firms have access
to theHt varieties available domestically within the country. A firm i imports nit varieties in period
t where pfat is the price of foreign variety a. I assume that p
f
at = p
f
t ∀ a (similar to Gopinath and
Neiman (2014)).12 This gives the price index of the imported intermediate bundle for firm i.
Pfit = p
f
t (nit)
θ−1
θ (2.13)
The price index of the imported intermediate input bundle is decreasing in nit (since 0 < θ <
1). The larger the number of varieties of inputs imported, lower is the price index of the foreign
intermediate bundle. From (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), the price index of the intermediate good
bundle is
Pxit = [P
ρ
ρ−1
dt + (p
f
t (nit)
θ−1
θ )
ρ
ρ−1 ]
ρ−1
ρ (2.14)
Given that 0 < θ < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1,
Px(Pdt, p
f
t , nit)− Px(Pdt, pft , nit − 1) < 0 (2.15)
The price index of the intermediate input bundle is decreasing in the number of imported vari-
eties. The larger the number of foreign varieties imported by the firm, the larger is the total number
of input varieties used by the firm (since firms will access all domestic varieties) and lower is the
12This simplifying assumption allows the firm’s choice to be over the number of varieties. This is so because all
imported varieties are identical in the way they enter the production function. If the assumption of identical prices
was not made, the model would specify the ordering in which the varieties are chosen. This would be of interest if we
observed the firm’s choice of varieties and quantity of each variety purchased in the data.
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price index of the intermediate input bundle.13 From (2.10) and (2.15),
MC(Pdt, p
f
t , wt, ut, ωit, Kit, Qit, nit)−MC(Pdt, pft , wt, ut, ωit, Kit, Qit, nit − 1) < 0 (2.16)
From (2.10), it can also be seen that
∂MC(.)
∂ωit
< 0 (2.17)
Thus, for a given capital stock, firms with a larger number of imported varieties employed in
production (nit) and higher productivity (ωit) have a lower marginal cost of production. The firm
can reduce its marginal cost of production in t by importing more varieties of intermediate inputs
in t and investing in R & D in t − 1. However there are fixed costs involved in sourcing inputs
from abroad and engaging in R & D. The firm faces a trade off between paying the fixed costs of
importing foreign inputs and investing in R & D for a lower marginal cost of production.
A firm that exports, i.e., sells its products in both domestic and foreign markets, is more likely
to undertake the fixed cost of investing in R & D and purchasing imported varieties of intermediate
inputs as compared to a firm that only sells in the domestic market. In appendix A.1, I present
a framework to develop the intuition for why incentives for investing in R & D and importing
intermediate inputs vary by export status.
I assume that single product firms compete in monopolistically competitive domestic and for-
eign markets. The vector Ψit = (dxi , Ki, wt, ut, Pdt, p
f
t , f
n
i ,Φ
D
t ,Φt) represents the environment of
the firm where fni is the fixed cost of importing each foreign variety and Φ
D
t and Φt are indus-
try aggregates (in domestic and foreign markets) and the other variables are as defined before. I
also assume that the firm’s environment Ψit, is taken as given by the firm, is constant over time
(Ψit = Ψit+1) and the firm has perfect foresight over it. The firm chooses the number of imported
varieties and whether to invest in R & D or not. Since I am interested in how productivity evolves
differently for an exporter versus a non exporter and how this is determined by the import and R
& D behavior of the firm, I focus on these two decisions. I emphasize that the assumptions made
13This comes from the production technology specified and (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4).
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here are for the theoretical framework and that in the estimations, I adopt a more flexible approach.
For example, I do not assume single product firms or impose a market structure in the empirical
section. I directly use the information on all products and prices of firms, a large number of which
are multiproduct firms. Given that caveat, I give the basic implications that come out of the model
below and direct the interested reader to appendix A.1 for more details.
First, The marginal increase in variable profits from importing an additional variety of the
intermediate input is higher for an exporter (dxi = 1) compared to a non exporter (d
x
i = 0). It
follows that the optimal number of imported varieties is non decreasing in export status.
piit(., nit)− piit(., nit−1)|dxi = 1 > piit(., nit)− piit(., nit−1)|dxi = 0 (2.18)
n∗(ωit,Ψit|dxi = 1) ≥ n∗(ωit,Ψit|dxi = 0) (2.19)
Here, variable profits piit are gross profits before deducting any fixed costs and n∗(.) refers to the
optimal number of varieties.
Second, The expected marginal increase in variable profits in t+ 1 from investing in R & D in
t is higher for an exporter compared to a non exporter. This would imply that the probability of
engaging in R & D is increasing in export status.
[E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 1,Ψit)−E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 0,Ψit)]|dxi = 1 >
[E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 1,Ψit)− E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 0,Ψit)]|dxi = 0
(2.20)
What this implies is that exporters and non exporters have different incentives to import in-
termediate inputs and invest in R & D. This will result in different productivity trajectories for
exporters compared to non exporters. A preliminary data exploration of the relationship between
export status and R & D and import indicators does indicate that export-import and export-R &
D are highly correlated. In Table 2.1, I report the coefficients of three regressions - R & D status
on export status, import status on export status and the natural log of import intensity on export
status. Each of these regressions control for firm size and a full set of industry and year effects. All
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coefficients are positive and significant. Exporters have a higher probability of investing in R & D
(the difference between exporters and non exporters is 0.12), are more likely to import intermediate
inputs from abroad (the difference between exporters and non exporters is 0.27) and spend a higher
proportion of their expenditure on intermediate inputs on imports (the average difference between
exporters and non exporters is 6.10 percentage points.)
Table 2.1: Imports and R & D by Export Status
R & D Status Import Status Import Intensity
0.120*** 0.265*** 0.061***
(0.078) (0.097) (0.020)
Notes: Number of Observations is 45,835. Each column is a separate regression of the dependent variable on export status. Regressions control for
firm size, Industry and Year effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.3 Empirical Production Function
In this section, I discuss the measure of total productivity used. Physical quantities and varieties
of material inputs (both domestic and foreign) are not observed in the data. I move from the
production technology as given by (2.1) and (2.2) to a specification which uses expenditure on
intermediate inputs (domestic and foreign) as described in subsection 2.4.1. I also discuss how I
retrieve estimates that reflect physical productivity by using firm level price deflators to measure
output from firm revenues in subsection 2.4.2. This is in contrast to the literature which uses
industry price deflators to measure output from firm revenues. The use of industry price deflators
to measure output has some inherent problems which are addressed if information on firm prices
is used instead.
2.3.1 The Production Function and Imports
From the production technology for the intermediate input bundle, the price of the intermediate
input bundle and the optimal demand functions for the domestic and imported intermediate input
bundle, we can write the price of the intermediate input bundle in terms of the price of the domestic
input bundle (Pdt), the total expenditure on intermediate inputs (Mit = PitXit) and the expenditure
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on domestic intermediate inputs (Mdit = PdtXdit) . (See appendix A.2)
Pxit = Pdt
(
Mit
Mdit
) ρ−1
ρ
(2.21)
Since data on physical quantities of each of the input varieties used by the firm are not observed,
I substitute forXit with MitPxit in the expression for the production technology of the firm. From (2.1)
and (2.30), the production function can thus be written as
Qit = e
ωitKαkit L
αl
it E
αe
it
(
Mit
Pdt
)αx (Mit
Mdit
)αχ
(2.22)
where αχ = αx
(
1−ρ
ρ
)
.
Usually, when production functions are estimated (including in the exports and productivity
literature), the role of imported inputs is ignored. The last term in (2.31) is not included and the
general form of the production function estimated is
Qit = e
ωitKαkit L
αl
it E
αe
it
(
Mit
Pdt
)αx
(2.23)
Expenditure on inputs is deflated by a common input price deflator (usually a wholesale price
index or an industry producer price index or a material inputs deflator). The term
(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
gets
subsumed in the estimate of productivity eωit . If all firms purchased all their inputs domestically,(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
would disappear and (2.31) would reduce to (2.32).
However, for some firms, a portion of the expenditure on intermediate inputs is on inputs
sourced from abroad. From (2.14) and (2.30),
Mit
Mdit
= 1 +
[
pft (nit)
θ−1
θ
Pdt
] ρ
ρ−1
(2.24)
Mit
Mdit
is increasing in nit and
(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
represents the advantage that accrues to a firm when it
sources some of its intermediate inputs from abroad. For a given level of capital, labor, energy and
expenditure on intermediate inputs, a higher import intensity represented by a larger Mit
Mdit
allows
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the firm to produce a higher output.
Thus, we can think of firms with larger nit (i.e., firms importing more foreign varieties) and ωit
having a lower marginal cost of production as seen in section 2.2. Analogously, firms with higher
import intensity ( Mit
Mdit
) and higher ωit are able to produce a higher level of output for a given level
of inputs.
The natural log of the production function (2.31) of firm i can be written as
qit = αllit + αkkit + αeeit + αxmit + αχχit + ωit + it (2.25)
The lower case letters q, l, k, e,m, χ refer to the natural log of quantity, labor, capital, energy,
expenditure on intermediate inputs and import intensity ( M
Md
) of intermediate inputs respectively.
The measure of total productivity of interest is αχχit + ωit, the first component of which is
attributable to imports of intermediate inputs by the firm and the second to firm R & D. Firms can
improve total productivity and lower marginal costs of production by importing foreign interme-
diate inputs and engaging in R &D. The second component of the firm’s total productivity ωit, is
known to the firm when it makes its decisions on inputs but is not observed in the data. Lastly, it
represents measurement error and idiosyncratic shocks to production.
2.3.2 Measuring Output based on Revenues and Prices
Since firm revenue Rit = Pit ∗ Qit, firm output can be measured from firm revenues and firm
prices. If qit, pit and rit are the natural logarithm of firm output, firm prices and firm revenue
respectively,
qit = rit − pit (2.26)
Data on firm prices are often not available. Papers that estimate firm-level productivity (includ-
ing the export-productivity literature) typically measure firm output by deflating firm revenues by
an industry price deflator (pIt) which is common to all firms within an industry I . So they measure
the natural log of firm output as
q˜it = rit − pIt (2.27)
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Using (2.35) and (2.36), if we substitute for q˜it = qit − (pit − pIt) into (2.34), the production
function becomes
q˜it = αllit + αkkit + αeeit + αxmit + αχχit + ω˜it + it (2.28)
where,
ω˜it = (pit − pIt) + ωit (2.29)
If firms operated in perfectly competitive markets where each firm was a price taker and
charged the industry price (i.e, pit = pIt), (2.34) and (2.37) would be equivalent to each other.
However, when we deviate from the assumption of perfect competition (i.e, pit 6= pIt), two prob-
lems arise.
The first is the omitted price bias. In the absence of firm prices, if industry prices are used to
measure output as q˜it instead of qit, the estimates of the coefficients of the production function will
be biased. As long as E[(pit − pIt)zit] 6= 0, where zit refers to the vector of inputs, the use of
industry level price deflators to deflate revenues to proxy for output will yield incorrect estimates
of the coefficients of the production function. (See Klette and Griliches (1996) for a detailed
exposition of the omitted price bias).14
The second problem is specific to the export-productivity question when we try to estimate
within firm changes to total productivity from export entry. If firms face downward sloping demand
curves and pass on some of the benefits of gains in productivity to consumers by lowering prices,
pit falls as ωit rises. In this case, using estimates of productivity from (2.37) will underestimate
gains to firms’ post export market entry.15
14Everything else being equal, firms charging higher prices would have lower market shares. They would sell
fewer units of output and employ fewer inputs i.e., price and inputs would be negatively correlated. However, more
productive firms also need fewer inputs to produce the same output. So the relationship may not be so clear cut.
15Theoretical models of trade such as Melitz (2003b) model firms as operating in monopolistically competitive
markets. In equilibrium, firms charge a price in domestic and export markets which is a constant mark up over
marginal cost. The mark ups are given by the inverse of the elasticity of demand in the two markets. If firms improve
productivity and reduce marginal costs, these models predict a complete pass through of these gains to consumers in
the form of lower prices.
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There is a wide variation in price changes across firms in a given industry in any year. I discuss
concerns with using industry level price deflators to deflate firm revenues and use that to proxy for
quantities by using the example of the transport equipment industry. Table 2.2 shows the yearly
price change (over the previous year) for the transport equipment industry. The last column (6)
gives the yearly price change as given by the Output Deflator of the transport equipment industry
at the aggregate industry level as calculated by the Central Statistical Organization, Government
of India. The average growth rates from the industry level indices are positive for every year in the
period. Column (5) gives the standard deviation of firm price changes for each year as observed in
the firm dataset.
Table 2.2: Price Changes in Transport Equipment Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Decline Price Increase Firm Data WPI
Year % of Firms Mean % of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Industry Level
1990 6.06 -0.21 93.94 0.13 0.11 0.11
1991 13.64 -0.07 86.36 0.11 0.10 0.09
1992 6.06 -0.22 93.94 0.18 0.15 0.11
1993 7.77 -0.07 92.23 0.12 0.12 0.07
1994 32.52 -0.07 67.48 0.09 0.12 0.03
1995 27.52 -0.12 72.48 0.13 0.17 0.07
1996 24.54 -0.11 75.46 0.13 0.15 0.08
1997 25.00 -0.11 75.00 0.11 0.14 0.06
1998 43.03 -0.10 56.97 0.09 0.14 0.04
1999 44.68 -0.09 55.32 0.09 0.14 0.03
2000 37.08 -0.09 62.92 0.10 0.13 0.03
2001 36.86 -0.10 63.14 0.11 0.16 0.06
2002 52.80 -0.09 47.20 0.11 0.15 0.02
2003 43.80 -0.10 56.20 0.09 0.14 0.00
2004 42.69 -0.10 57.31 0.12 0.16 0.00
2005 32.02 -0.10 67.98 0.14 0.18 0.05
Notes: Column (6) shows price change for the for Transport Equipment Industry using the industry price deflator from the Government of India
Price Statistics (WPI) from the 1993-94 price series. Columns (1)-(5) are constructed from firm level price data.
Columns (1) and (2) report the percentage of firms that experienced decline in prices over
the previous year and the mean reduction in prices over the previous year for firms with negative
growth, while columns (3) and (4) give the percentage of firms that experienced positive growth
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in prices over the previous year and the average increase in prices for the firms with positive
growth. For example, in the year 2000, 37 % of firms saw on average a nine percent fall in
their prices from 1999 while 63 % of the firms experienced a ten percent increase in prices on
average. Price changes of firms varied widely as can be seen by the standard deviation. The use
of the industry level deflator would assume that every firm experienced a three percent increase in
prices over the previous year. Deflating revenues by the industry deflator would underestimate the
quantity changes for firms with price changes less than three percent and overestimate the quantity
changes for firms with growth in prices over three percent. This would imply that productivity
change is underestimated for firms that experience a change in price of less than three percent and
overestimated for firms that experience a change in price greater than three percent.
Information on prices allows me to estimate (2.34). I construct firm specific price deflators,
which vary across firms within an industry, unlike industry level deflators that are common to all
firms in an industry. I thus recover estimates of the production function coefficients and ωit that do
not suffer from the shortcomings discussed above.
2.4 Empirical Production Function
In this section, I discuss the measure of total productivity used. Physical quantities and varieties
of material inputs (both domestic and foreign) are not observed in the data. I move from the
production technology as given by (2.1) and (2.2) to a specification which uses expenditure on
intermediate inputs (domestic and foreign) as described in subsection 2.4.1. I also discuss how I
retrieve estimates that reflect physical productivity by using firm level price deflators to measure
output from firm revenues in subsection 2.4.2. This is in contrast to the literature which uses
industry price deflators to measure output from firm revenues. The use of industry price deflators
to measure output has some inherent problems which are addressed if information on firm prices
is used instead.
2.4.1 The Production Function and Imports
From the production technology for the intermediate input bundle, the price of the intermediate
input bundle and the optimal demand functions for the domestic and imported intermediate input
bundle, we can write the price of the intermediate input bundle in terms of the price of the domestic
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input bundle (Pdt), the total expenditure on intermediate inputs (Mit = PitXit) and the expenditure
on domestic intermediate inputs (Mdit = PdtXdit) . (See appendix A.2)
Pxit = Pdt
(
Mit
Mdit
) ρ−1
ρ
(2.30)
Since data on physical quantities of each of the input varieties used by the firm are not observed,
I substitute forXit with MitPxit in the expression for the production technology of the firm. From (2.1)
and (2.30), the production function can thus be written as
Qit = e
ωitKαkit L
αl
it E
αe
it
(
Mit
Pdt
)αx (Mit
Mdit
)αχ
(2.31)
where αχ = αx
(
1−ρ
ρ
)
.
Usually, when production functions are estimated (including in the exports and productivity
literature), the role of imported inputs is ignored. The last term in (2.31) is not included and the
general form of the production function estimated is
Qit = e
ωitKαkit L
αl
it E
αe
it
(
Mit
Pdt
)αx
(2.32)
Expenditure on inputs is deflated by a common input price deflator (usually a wholesale price
index or an industry producer price index or a material inputs deflator). The term
(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
gets
subsumed in the estimate of productivity eωit . If all firms purchased all their inputs domestically,(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
would disappear and (2.31) would reduce to (2.32).
However, for some firms, a portion of the expenditure on intermediate inputs is on inputs
sourced from abroad. From (2.14) and (2.30),
Mit
Mdit
= 1 +
[
pft (nit)
θ−1
θ
Pdt
] ρ
ρ−1
(2.33)
Mit
Mdit
is increasing in nit and
(
Mit
Mdit
)αχ
represents the advantage that accrues to a firm when it
sources some of its intermediate inputs from abroad. For a given level of capital, labor, energy and
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expenditure on intermediate inputs, a higher import intensity represented by a larger Mit
Mdit
allows
the firm to produce a higher output.
Thus, we can think of firms with larger nit (i.e., firms importing more foreign varieties) and ωit
having a lower marginal cost of production as seen in section 2.2. Analogously, firms with higher
import intensity ( Mit
Mdit
) and higher ωit are able to produce a higher level of output for a given level
of inputs.
The natural log of the production function (2.31) of firm i can be written as
qit = αllit + αkkit + αeeit + αxmit + αχχit + ωit + it (2.34)
The lower case letters q, l, k, e,m, χ refer to the natural log of quantity, labor, capital, energy,
expenditure on intermediate inputs and import intensity ( M
Md
) of intermediate inputs respectively.
The measure of total productivity of interest is αχχit + ωit, the first component of which is
attributable to imports of intermediate inputs by the firm and the second to firm R & D. Firms can
improve total productivity and lower marginal costs of production by importing foreign interme-
diate inputs and engaging in R & D. The second component of the firm’s total productivity ωit, is
known to the firm when it makes its decisions on inputs but is not observed in the data. Lastly, it
represents measurement error and idiosyncratic shocks to production.
2.4.2 Measuring Output based on Revenues and Prices
Since firm revenue Rit = Pit ∗ Qit, firm output can be measured from firm revenues and firm
prices. If qit, pit and rit are the natural logarithm of firm output, firm prices and firm revenue
respectively,
qit = rit − pit (2.35)
Data on firm prices are often not available. Papers that estimate firm-level productivity (includ-
ing the export-productivity literature) typically measure firm output by deflating firm revenues by
an industry price deflator (pIt) which is common to all firms within an industry I . So they measure
the natural log of firm output as
q˜it = rit − pIt (2.36)
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Using (2.35) and (2.36), if we substitute for q˜it = qit − (pit − pIt) into (2.34), the production
function becomes
q˜it = αllit + αkkit + αeeit + αxmit + αχχit + ω˜it + it (2.37)
where,
ω˜it = (pit − pIt) + ωit (2.38)
If firms operated in perfectly competitive markets where each firm was a price taker and
charged the industry price (i.e, pit = pIt), (2.34) and (2.37) would be equivalent to each other.
However, when we deviate from the assumption of perfect competition (i.e, pit 6= pIt), two prob-
lems arise.
The first is the omitted price bias. In the absence of firm prices, if industry prices are used to
measure output as q˜it instead of qit, the estimates of the coefficients of the production function will
be biased. As long as E[(pit − pIt)zit] 6= 0, where zit refers to the vector of inputs, the use of
industry level price deflators to deflate revenues to proxy for output will yield incorrect estimates
of the coefficients of the production function. (See Klette and Griliches (1996) for a detailed
exposition of the omitted price bias).16
The second problem is specific to the export-productivity question when we try to estimate
within firm changes to total productivity from export entry. If firms face downward sloping demand
curves and pass on some of the benefits of gains in productivity to consumers by lowering prices,
pit falls as ωit rises. In this case, using estimates of productivity from (2.37) will underestimate
gains to firms’ post export market entry.17
16Everything else being equal, firms charging higher prices would have lower market shares. They would sell
fewer units of output and employ fewer inputs i.e., price and inputs would be negatively correlated. However, more
productive firms also need fewer inputs to produce the same output. So the relationship may not be so clear cut.
17Theoretical models of trade such as Melitz (2003b) model firms as operating in monopolistically competitive
markets. In equilibrium, firms charge a price in domestic and export markets which is a constant mark up over
marginal cost. The mark ups are given by the inverse of the elasticity of demand in the two markets. If firms improve
productivity and reduce marginal costs, these models predict a complete pass through of these gains to consumers in
the form of lower prices.
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There is a wide variation in price changes across firms in a given industry in any year. I discuss
concerns with using industry level price deflators to deflate firm revenues and use that to proxy for
quantities by using the example of the transport equipment industry. Table 2.2 shows the yearly
price change (over the previous year) for the transport equipment industry. The last column (6)
gives the yearly price change as given by the Output Deflator of the transport equipment industry
at the aggregate industry level as calculated by the Central Statistical Organization, Government
of India. The average growth rates from the industry level indices are positive for every year in the
period. Column (5) gives the standard deviation of firm price changes for each year as observed in
the firm dataset.
Columns (1) and (2) report the percentage of firms that experienced decline in prices over
the previous year and the mean reduction in prices over the previous year for firms with negative
growth, while columns (3) and (4) give the percentage of firms that experienced positive growth
in prices over the previous year and the average increase in prices for the firms with positive
growth. For example, in the year 2000, 37 % of firms saw on average a nine percent fall in
their prices from 1999 while 63 % of the firms experienced a ten percent increase in prices on
average. Price changes of firms varied widely as can be seen by the standard deviation. The use
of the industry level deflator would assume that every firm experienced a three percent increase in
prices over the previous year. Deflating revenues by the industry deflator would underestimate the
quantity changes for firms with price changes less than three percent and overestimate the quantity
changes for firms with growth in prices over three percent. This would imply that productivity
change is underestimated for firms that experience a change in price of less than three percent and
overestimated for firms that experience a change in price greater than three percent.
Information on prices allows me to estimate (2.34). I construct firm specific price deflators,
which vary across firms within an industry, unlike industry level deflators that are common to all
firms in an industry. I thus recover estimates of the production function coefficients and ωit that do
not suffer from the shortcomings discussed above.
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2.5 Estimation Strategy
The empirical strategy involves two steps. First, I recover the parameters of the the production
function and calculate estimates of total productivity (α̂χχit + ω̂it). Next, I use difference-in-
differences propensity score matching to examine the impact of starting to export on efficiency.
2.5.1 Recovering the Production Function Parameters
I estimate the parameters of (2.34) using proxy estimators for each industry separately. These
methods use a control function in a firm specific decision to proxy for productivity and control for
the simultaneity bias that arises because input demand and unobserved productivity are correlated.
I follow Ackerberg et al. (2015) who extends Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003).18
Under the time to build assumption for capital, capital used in production in period t is known in
period t−1. Given the restrictive labor laws in India on hiring, firing and closing down plants, there
are adjustment costs to labor.19 I assume like Ackerberg et al. (2015), that labor is not completely
mobile and is chosen at t − b where 0 < b < 1. Firms make decisions on importing intermediate
inputs. There are fixed costs to imports which involve searching for suppliers, navigating customs
procedures and getting delivery of inputs across borders. Under this setup, material inputs are not
fully adjustable. I assume material inputs are chosen at t− c where 0 < c < 1. Energy inputs are
fully flexible and are chosen at period t after capital, labor, material inputs (domestic and imported)
and productivity is observed.20
The demand function for energy inputs is given by eit = h(kit, lit,mit, χit, ωit). Under the
18Ackerberg et al. (2015) argue that the labor parameter cannot be consistently identified in the Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. They use the Value added production function because of concerns
that the variable inputs would be perfectly correlated and thus collinear. While I use the gross output production
function, I report the correlation matrix of all the input variables used in the production function in Table A.1 in
appendix A.3. While the inputs are positively correlated as is expected, they are not perfectly correlated (with all
correlations below .75).
19See Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007) for a discussion on labor market regulations and rigidities in India.
20The exact ordering of the timing assumptions of when labor and material inputs are chosen does not impact the
empirical estimation. The only assumption needed for the empirical estimation is that energy is chosen after observing
other inputs and productivity.
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monotonicity assumption (the demand for the variable input h(kit, lit,mit, χit, ωit) is strictly in-
creasing in ωit), the energy demand function can be inverted to proxy for unobserved productivity.
ωit = h
−1(kit, lit,mit, χit, eit) is the inverse demand function for energy.
Under the Ackerberg et al. (2015) method, no coefficient of the production function is estimated
in the first stage. The first stage is used to get a consistent estimate of expected output (φ̂it(.)).
qit = φit(lit, kit,mit, χit, eit) + it (2.39)
where
φit = αllit + αkkit + αxmit + αχχit + αeeit + h
−1(kit, lit,mit, χit, eit) (2.40)
In addition to the firm variables in h−1(.), I also include year dummies to account for macro trends
that could impact input demand.21. Once φ̂it(.) is estimated for any candidate candidate values of
the coefficients, productivity can be written as
ωit(α) = φ̂it − (α0 + αllit + αkkit + αxmit + αχχit + αeeit) (2.41)
For the candidate values of the coefficients, the productivity series can be used to estimate the
productivity evolution as given by
ωit = γ1ωit−1 + γ2dkit−1 + γ3ωit−1 ∗ dkit−1 + ζit (2.42)
From (2.41) and (2.42), ζit can be recovered for the candidate values of the coefficients. ωit is
decomposed into two parts. The first part constitutes the conditional expectation of productivity
based on the information set known in period t − 1. The second, ζit, is the deviation from the
expectation. ζit is mean independent of the information known in t − 1 and is not correlated
with the past decisions of the firm. This provides the basis for the instruments for identifying the
21I use a fifth degree polynomial in capital, labor, material inputs, labor and energy to get an estimate of φ̂it.
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coefficients through GMM using the moment conditions.
E(ζit(α, γ)Zit) = 0 (2.43)
The instrument set includes current capital kit (since it is chosen in t − 1) and lagged values
of the other variables (lit−1, mit−1, χit−1, eit−1, dkit−1, φ̂it−1(.) and φ̂it−1(.) ∗ dkit−1) to identify the
production function parameters and the parameters of the productivity evolution process since they
are all uncorrelated with ζit.
2.5.2 Gains from Exporting
The overall productivity is α̂χχit + ω̂it, which is constituted of two parts. The first is produc-
tivity due to imports of intermediate inputs and the second is productivity due to investment in R
& D. To examine the impact of entry into export markets on firm productivity, I follow the micro-
econometrics literature on program evaluation and estimate the average effect of treatment on the
treated (ATT).22
In the context of this paper, treatment (W) is the entry into export markets and the outcome of
interest (Yis) is productivity of firm i in period s. I define an export entrant as a firm that enters
into the export market for the first time and is an exporter for a minimum of two years. Also, the
firms should have an observed history of at least two years in the data prior to export entry.
Since I do not observe the counter-factual of the outcome of interest had the treated firm not
entered into the export market, I estimate propensity scores as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) to find a control group as close as possible to the treated group. W takes the value 1 if
the firm begins to export and 0 otherwise. To get a value for the counter-factual outcome if the
exporting firm had not entered the export market, the control group is from the group of never
exporters. The propensity score or the probability of entry into export markets is
P (Wit = 1) = Φ
(
f(ωit−1, kit−1, lit−1, dkit−1, χit−1)
)
(2.44)
22See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a comprehensive overview.
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where P (Wit = 1) is the probability of the firm starting to export at period t, Φ is the cumu-
lative normal distribution and f(.) is a polynomial of the variables. I also include a full set of
year and industry effects in the equation. The panel dataset allows me to implement a Difference-
in-Differences (DID) matching estimator as suggested by Heckman et al. (1997). Blundell and
Costa Dias (2000) note that combining matching with DID allows for the possibility of unob-
servables affecting participation if they can be represented by separable firm specific and /or time
specific components.
Matching treated and control groups on propensity scores requires two assumptions. The com-
mon support assumption requires the possibility of a non treated counterpart for each treated firm.
It is given by P (W = 1)|P < 1, where P is the propensity score.
The conditional mean assumption requires that the expected change in outcome of the treated
firm had it not been treated should be the same as the expected change in outcome of the control
firm i.e., E(Y 0t′ −Y 0t−1|P,W = 1) = E(Y 0t′ −Y 0t−1|P,W = 0). Here, t− 1 denotes the time period
just prior to export entry, t′ = t+ i where i = 1, 2, 3, 4... denote time periods after export entry and
(Y 0t′ −Y 0t−1) denotes the change in the outcome of interest between the two periods in the untreated
state.
The treatment on the treated is given by
δτ =
1
N
(∑
i∈T
(Y 1it′ − Y 1it−1)−
∑
j∈C
wij(Y
c
jt′ − Y cjt−1)
)
(2.45)
Here N refers to the number of firms that start to export, T refers to the treated group i.e., the
export starters and C refers to the control group of never exporters. Each firm i ∈ T is matched to
firms in the control group and wij is the weight on each firm j in the control group as a match for
firm i. 23 Y 1it′ − Y 1it−1 is the change in the outcome variable for the export entrant between t′ and
t − 1 and Y cjt′ − Y cjt−1 is the change in the outcome variable for the control firms between t′ and
t− 1.
23For example, a nearest neighbor matching with one neighbor would mean that for firm i ∈ T , the firm most
similar to firm i in the control group C would have wij = 1 and all the remaining firms in C would have wij = 0.
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The outcomes of interest are (α̂χχit + ω̂it) as well as the individual components α̂χχit and ω̂it,
to examine whether overall productivity improves on export entry as well as the relative importance
of the two different channels.
2.6 Data
The firm level variables are from the Prowess dataset provided by the Center for Monitoring
of the Indian Economy (CMIE). This is a panel dataset of Indian firms in the organized sector.
It includes both listed and unlisted firms. The dataset has been used in several papers including
Goldberg et al. (2010) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
I use data on firm observations from 1989 to 2005. For these years, there is information on all
the firm variables used in the production function estimation as well as quantities and sales values
of products of firms. There are data on 5, 850 manufacturing firms with 45, 835 firm year observa-
tions. The firms belong to thirteen major industry groups.24 Industries are classified according to
the National Industrial Classification (NIC 2008). There is a one to one correspondence between
the NIC and ISIC (The United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification).
The dataset is appropriate for this study because it tracks firm performance over time for a
variety of variables. In addition to the usual variables on revenue and inputs, which are relevant for
productivity estimation, it also contains data on variables relating to firm activity in international
markets (exports and imports) as well as on investment in knowledge (R & D spending). It also
has product level data on all products produced by the firm which allows for the construction of
firm specific price deflators.
All input variables have been deflated to 1989 − 90 levels using deflators from the 1993 − 94
price series. Energy, Wages and Capital Stock were deflated by the power and fuel, wholesale
price index and machinery deflators respectively. I created input price deflators for each industry
by passing output deflators through the input-output matrix for each industry. Summary statistics
for the variables used in the production function are reported in Table 3.3.
The measure of quantity I use is the firm sales revenue deflated by the firm specific price
24I exclude minor industries such as printing, coke and petroleum products etc., where the number of firm year
observations are too few to allow for estimation of the production function parameters.
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deflator. The import intensity term is the total expenditure on intermediate inputs divided by the
expenditure on domestic inputs. All firm output and input variables (quantity, labor, capital, energy,
material inputs and import intensity) are expressed as natural logarithms while the export and R
& D indicator are discrete variables. There are 544 export entrants where an export entrant is as
defined in subsection 2.5.2.
The dataset contains information on the number of units sold as well as total sales value of
the product for each product of the firm. This gives us unit values of the product. There are
data on about 150, 000 product year observations. 1, 658 firms are single product firms throughout
the period while the remaining firms sell two or more products at at least some point in the pe-
riod. Products are assigned a product code based on the product classification developed by CMIE
Prowess. Each product code is matched to a five digit industry.
I follow Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2004), Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and
Kugler (2010) and Ornaghi (2008) to construct firm-specific price deflators as Tornqvist indices of
the weighted average growth of prices of all products produced by the firm. (See appendix A.2.1).
I report the summary statistics for price deflators constructed from the firm data as well as industry
deflators from the price series data from the Government of India Statistics Division in the last two
rows of Table 3.3.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Output (q) 5.114 1.676 -3.271 12.00
Labor (l) 2.176 1.708 -3.405 9.731
Capital (k) 4.102 1.652 -3.096 11.51
Intermediate Inputs (m) 4.215 1.784 -3.478 10.66
Energy (e) 1.470 1.931 -3.885 8.749
Import Intensity (χ) 0.132 0.214 0 1.627
Export Indicator 0.555 0.496 0 1
R & D Indicator 0.253 0.434 0 1
Firm Deflator 193.6 98.81 9.391 4,200
Industry Deflator 198.8 50.29 100 367.1
Notes: Firm Inputs and Output variables are in natural logs. Output is firm revenue deflated by the firm specific price deflators. The number of
observations is 45,835 and the number of firms is 5,850.
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2.7 Results
I begin by estimating the parameters of the production function (2.34) and the endogenous
productivity evolution process (2.42) as described in subsection 2.5.1. The estimates are presented
in subsection 2.7.1. In subsection 2.7.2, I discuss the baseline results of the gains from starting
to export on overall productivity. I also present the estimates from the two separate components
- productivity growth from imports of intermediate inputs, and productivity growth from R & D.
Finally, in subsection 2.7.3, I present results from robustness checks.
2.7.1 Production Function Parameters: Imports and R & D
Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 present the results for the parameters of the production function and
productivity evolution process. All these three sets of parameters are estimated simultaneously for
the output production function where output of the firm is constructed from deflating firm revenues
with the firm specific price deflator.
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results for the production function parameters for thirteen ma-
jor manufacturing industry groups. αl, αk, αx, αe represent the share of labor, capital, material
inputs and energy inputs respectively in the production function. The magnitude of these parame-
ters are reasonable across industries for these different inputs.25
The table also presents the output from the Wald test for constant returns to scale. The null
hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected in seven out of the thirteen industries at the 10
percent level (and in six of the thirteen at the 5 percent level). Marin and Voigtlander (2013) use
marginal cost as their measure of efficiency to capture productivity improvements through export
entry. Marginal costs may decline not just because of productivity improvements but also with
changes in capital stock. They show in their paper that, under the assumption of constant returns
to scale, changes in marginal costs would reflect changes in productivity.
25Once the coefficients are estimated, the ω values are calculated. In appendix A.3, I graph the overall distribution
of ω in Figure A.1. I also plot the ω values by year in Figure A.2
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When technology does not exhibit constant returns to scale, changes in marginal costs would
also be capturing changes in capital stock. In the context of Indian manufacturing, where about
half the industries do not exhibit constant returns to scale, the approach used in this paper, where
productivity is directly measured, is more appropriate rather than the use of marginal cost as a
measure to capture productivity changes.
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of the imported inputs term in the production function. αχ is
the estimate on the import intensity term (χ) in the production function where χ takes a value 0
if the firm does not import from abroad (since in that case, Mit = Mdit and χ is the natural log
of Mit
Mdit
). χ is increasing in the expenditure share on imported intermediate inputs. The coefficient
(αχ) is positive in all thirteen industries. Everything else held equal, firms that import a larger share
of their intermediate inputs from abroad are able to produce higher output with the given inputs.
To illustrate, in the transport equipment industry, a 10 percent increase in the Mit
Mdit
ratio (which
is approximately a 9 percent decline in the expenditure share of domestic inputs in total inputs),
while holding all inputs fixed (capital, labor, energy and total expenditure on intermediate inputs)
will result in a 5.4 percent increase in total output.
The table also presents the implied values for ρ which are calculated from the estimates of αx
and αχ for each of these industries since αχ = αx
(
1−ρ
ρ
)
. The elasticity of substitution between
the domestic and imported input bundle is given by 1
1−ρ . The CES model restricts the value of ρ to
be between 0 and 1. The implied values for ρ for all the thirteen industry groups falls within this
range.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the endogenous productivity process. The coefficient γ1
measures the impact of previous period firm productivity on current productivity and is positive
in all industries. The coefficient γ2 measures the average impact of the lagged discrete decision
to invest in R & D on current productivity and is positive in all industries. Firms that undertake
investment in R & D have on average, 2 to 5 percent higher productivity than firms that do not.
However, the impact of doing R & D on productivity varies with the firm’s initial productivity
level. The coefficient on the interaction term γ3 captures the idea that the productivity effects
from investing in R & D depends on the firm’s initial productivity level. In twelve of the thirteen
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Table 2.5: Imports in the Production Function
Imports
αχ ρ
Food & Beverages 0.467*** 0.529
(0.131)
Textiles & Apparel 0.386*** 0.646
(0.129)
Paper & Products 0.078 0.903
(0.138)
Basic Chemicals 0.258* 0.668
(0.139)
Chemical Products 0.298 0.689
(0.329)
Pharmaceuticals 0.137 0.819
(0.474)
Rubber & Plastic 0.096 0.819
(0.174)
Mineral Products 0.144 0.800
(0.338)
Basic Metals & Products 0.234* 0.756
(0.131)
Computer & Electronics 0.066 0.929
(0.160)
Electrical Equipment 0.351* 0.688
(0.182)
Machinery 0.318 0.694
(0.212)
Transport Equipment 0.540*** 0.562
(0.165)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Productivity Evolution: Past Productivity and Investment in R & D
ωt−1 dkt−1 ωt−1Xd
k
t−1
γ1 γ2 γ3
Food & Beverages 0.052 0.016* 0.697***
(0.047) (0.009) (0.087)
Textiles & Apparel 0.321** 0.025*** 0.500***
(0.144) (0.007) (0.161)
Paper & Products 0.422*** 0.046* 0.095
(0.095) (0.024) (0.309)
Basic Chemicals 0.762*** 0.000 -0.391***
(0.047) (0.028) (0.139)
Chemical Products 0.662*** 0.024** 0.354**
(0.096) (0.012) (0.165)
Pharmaceuticals 0.565*** 0.032*** 0.322**
(0.081) (0.009) (0.140)
Rubber & Plastic 0.778*** 0.024** 0.151*
(0.039) (0.011) (0.081)
Mineral Products 0.094 0.042*** 0.960***
(0.331) (0.008) (0.333)
Basic Metals & Products 0.694*** 0.024*** 0.273***
(0.042) (0.005) (0.051)
Computer & Electronics 0.224 0.011 0.432*
(0.164) (0.023) (0.238)
Electrical Equipment 0.001 0.035*** 0.845***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.087)
Machinery 0.317 0.033*** 0.994**
(0.241) (0.012) (0.415)
Transport Equipment 0.521*** 0.022*** 0.397*
(0.123) (0.005) (0.240)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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industries, this term is positive. This implies that the productivity gains from investing in R &
D is higher for more productive firms in almost all industries across the board. To illustrate,
the difference in productivity growth is 1.9 percentage points for a median productivity firm that
engaged in R & D in the previous period compared to one that did not engage in R & D in the
previous period. This difference is about 18.6 percentage points for a firm in the 90th percentile of
productivity. 26
2.7.2 Gains from Export Entry
I begin by graphically showing the productivity trajectory of an export entrant who has starting
exporting in period t = 0. Figure 2.1 depicts the productivity trajectory for the export entrant using
measures of revenue productivity as well as physical productivity.27 I plot average productivity on
the vertical axis while the horizontal axis depicts time. Here, revenue productivity is the produc-
tivity measure retrieved when sales revenue are deflated by industry deflators and this is used to
proxy for output in the production function. Physical productivity measures I have used are where
sales revenues are deflated by firm specific deflators and used as a measure of firm output in the
production function.
As can be seen in the graph, the export entrant’s revenue productivity is more or less stagnant
over the six years following export entry. On the other hand, the average productivity (physical)
of the export entrant increases and continues to rise from the time the firm begins to export. These
different productivity trajectories highlight the need to retrieve measures of productivity that cap-
ture physical productivity to estimate gains from export entry. I refer to the physical productivity
measure as total productivity.
While Figure 2.1 shows that average total productivity rises for an export entrant, it does not
indicate how differently productivity would have evolved had the firm not started exporting. In Fig-
ure 2.2, I graph how the productivity trajectory of an export entrant compares with a non exporter
26Median productivity of a firm in the transport industry equals −.008 while a 90th percentile firm has productivity
which equals .414. The parameters of the productivity process in the transport industry are γ1 = 0.521, γ2 = .022
and γ3 = 0.397
27These productivity trajectories are based on 348 export entrants for which data are available for the entire period
under consideration
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Figure 2.1: Productivity Trajectory for Export Entrant (Revenue vs. Physical Productivity)
Average Firm Specific Total Productivity
Figure 2.2: Productivity Trajectory for Export Starter vs. Non Exporter Counterpart
Average Firm Specific Total Productivity (From Imports and R & D)
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control firm.28 While both the export entrant and the non exporter counterpart see an increase in
average productivity after the firm enters the export market, the average productivity of the ex-
porter rises faster than the average productivity of its non exporter counterpart. They have similar
trajectories prior to export entry. However, after the firm begins to export, their trajectories diverge
and the gap between them widens over time.
In Table 2.7, I present the results to show how entering into an export market impacts pro-
ductivity. Since the variables are in natural logarithms and log differences are growth rates, the
coefficients of the DID estimator can be interpreted as the difference in growth rates over time for
the export entrant as compared to the non exporter counterpart.29 The firm begins exporting in
period t and t+ i where i = 1, 2, .. refers to the time period i years after the firm enters the export
market.
Table 2.7: Productivity Growth over Time from Export Entry: Matching Results
Total Productivity Imports R & D
α̂χχit + ω̂it α̂χχit ω̂it
t+1 0.063** 0.001 0.061**
(0.028) (0.004) (0.029)
t+2 0.072*** 0.008 0.065**
(0.024) (0.006) (0.027)
t+3 0.067* 0.011* 0.055*
(0.035) (0.006) (0.033)
t+4 0.081** 0.017*** 0.065*
(0.033) (0.006) (0.035)
t+5 0.092** 0.019*** 0.074**
(0.036) (0.005) (0.035)
t+6 0.103*** 0.017*** 0.087**
(0.038) (0.005) (0.039)
Notes: Nearest Neighbor matching using three neighbors with replacement. The number of treated is 348. Block Bootstrap Standard errors given
in parentheses (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The first column presents the average treatment of the treated δτ for overall productivity (α̂χχit+
28.The control firm was chosen as described in subsection 2.5.2 using nearest neighbor matching techniques.
29For example, if a export entrant experienced 15% productivity growth and a non exporter counterpart experienced
a 5% productivity growth, the coefficient on δτ would be .10 which reflects that export entrants productivity growth
rate was 10 percentage points higher.
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ω̂it). In the first year after export entry (t + 1), the average productivity growth (with respect to
t − 1) is about 6.3 percentage points higher for an export entrant as compared to a non exporter
control. Over a four year period after export entry, the export entrant’s total productivity grows
by 8.1 percentage points more than a non exporter counterpart and over the six year period, the
difference in growth was more than 10 percentage points. The export entrant starts to experience
a higher growth from the first period following entry into the export market and the difference in
overall growth persists over six years following export entry. The estimate of δτ is significant for
every time period for the six years.
Column 2 of Table 2.7 presents the estimates of the coefficients (δτ ) for the component of pro-
ductivity attributable to imports (α̂χχit) and column 3 presents the coefficients (δτ ) for component
of productivity attributable to firm investment in R & D (ω̂it). While the coefficients are positive
and significant for both components, they are much larger in magnitude for the R & D component.
The estimates of δτ in t + 3 are 0.011 (0.006) and 0.055 (0.033) for the import component of
productivity and the R & D component of productivity respectively and in t + 6 are 0.017 (0.005)
and 0.087 (0.039). Thus, over a six year period, the difference in productivity growth from the
R & D component (compared to pre-entry levels) between an export entrant and a non exporter
counterpart is 8.7 percentage points while this difference is 1.7 percentage points for the imports
component.
The coefficients in Table 2.7 were estimated by following the same set of export entrants (and
their non-exporter counterparts) over the six year period. The sample of export entrants is thus
restricted to firms that are observed for every year in the dataset for at least six years after export
entry. To check that the results are not driven by sample selection, I estimate the coefficients for all
export entrants as defined in subsection 2.5.2. Thus the number of export entrants is not constant
but varies by period depending on the number of years for which they are observed after they
begin to export. For example, an export entrant that begins exporting in 2003 is only observed for
two years after entry into the export market since the dataset ends at 2005. The results from the
unrestricted sample are presented in Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8: Productivity Growth from Export Entry (All export entrants): Matching Results
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Total Productivity 0.056** 0.079*** 0.079** 0.098*** 0.117*** 0.112**
(α̂χχit + ω̂it) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.046)
Imports 0.008** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(α̂χχit) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
R & D 0.048* 0.064** 0.064* 0.081** 0.102*** 0.098**
(ω̂it) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.046)
Notes: Nearest Neighbor matching using three neighbors with replacement. The number of treated varies by year (544 to 364). Block Bootstrap
Standard errors given in parentheses (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The first row shows the δτ for total productivity and the second and third rows show the esti-
mates of δτ for productivity growth from imports and productivity growth from R & D while the
columns give the time period. The results are very similar to the restricted sample results. In t+ 1
the estimates for δτ for total productivity, productivity from imports and productivity from R &
D are 0.056 (.026), 0.008 (.003) and 0.048 (0.026) respectively and three years after export entry
(t+3), they are 0.079 (0.037), 0.015 (0.004) and 0.064 (0.037) respectively. Over a six year period,
overall productivity growth is 11.2 percentage points higher for a export entrant compared to its
non exporter counterpart with the percentage difference in growth being 1.5 percentage points for
the import component and 9.8 percentage points for the R & D component. Thus, as with the re-
stricted sample, while both imports and R & D contribute to productivity growth, the contribution
of the R & D channel is much larger.
2.7.3 Robustness Checks
I verify whether the results from subsection 2.7.2 are robust to concerns about foreign firms
possibly driving the productivity growth of exporters or the possibility of export entrants having
different growth rates than their non exporter counterparts prior to export entry in anticipation of
selling in foreign markets or the choice of matching estimator.
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Domestic vs. Foreign Firms
The period of study coincides with the easing of entry requirements of foreign firms into India.
Prowess defines foreign firms as firms incorporated outside India or owned by foreigners (private
or Government).30 One concern might be that the results may be driven by foreign firms as these
firms already have contacts with foreign suppliers of inputs and can more easily access technology.
They are thus more likely to import foreign inputs and engage in R & D. I drop the 90 foreign firms
from the sample and check whether the average treatment effect on the treated is different when
only the sample of domestic firms is considered.
Table 2.9 presents the results for the sample of domestic firms. The estimate of δτ is 0.063
(.026) in t+ 1 and increase to 0.115 (.041) in t+ 6. Thus, six years post entry into export markets,
domestic firms grow by 11.6 percentage points more than the control firms with respect to their pre-
entry productivity levels. The estimates for the separate components of productivity from imports
and R & D mirror the baseline results for entire sample. While both imports and R &D contribute
to the differences in productivity trajectories of export entrants and their non exporter counterparts,
the contribution of the R & D component is much greater in magnitude. The coefficients illustrates
that foreign firms are not driving the results and that the estimates are significant and of similar
magnitude even when only domestic firms are considered.
Productivity Growth Prior to Export Entry
One possible concern could be that export entrants experience a positive productivity shock
prior to export entry which carries over to the post entry period. Alternatively they could begin
preparations to export prior to the export entry by engaging in R & D and imports of foreign inputs.
Since I match on pre-entry productivity levels as well as pre-entry import intensity and R & D,
export entrants and their non-exporter counterparts are similar on these indicators. Furthermore,
I check if there are differences in pre-entry growth rates of productivity for three periods prior to
starting to export. The results are presented in Table 2.10. The average growth rates for export
entrants and their non exporter counterparts prior to entry into export markets are not different
30This is an time invariant firm specific variable.
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Table 2.9: Productivity Growth over Time from Export Entry (Domestic Firms): Matching Results
Total Productivity Imports R & D
α̂χχit + ω̂it α̂χχit ω̂it
t+1 0.063** 0.003 0.060**
(0.026) (0.004) (0.027)
t+2 0.081*** 0.009 0.071**
(0.029) (0.006) (0.031)
t+3 0.091*** 0.013** 0.078**
(0.033) (0.006) (0.036)
t+4 0.105*** 0.018*** 0.087**
(0.037) (0.006) (0.037)
t+5 0.107*** 0.020*** 0.087**
(0.038) (0.006) (0.040)
t+6 0.115*** 0.018*** 0.097**
(0.041) (0.005) (0.044)
Notes: Nearest Neighbor matching using three neighbors with replacement. The number of treated is 322. Block Bootstrap Standard errors given
in parentheses (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
from each other.
Table 2.10: Productivity Growth prior to entry
Productivity Growth Export Entrant Non Exporter Control t Statistic (Difference) p > |t|
t−1 to t0 0.033 0.019 0.67 0.504
t−2 to t−1 0.064 0.038 0.77 0.44
t−3 to t−2 0.021 0.024 -0.08 0.935
Alternate Matching
Finally, I check whether the results are robust to alternate matching estimators. The main re-
sults presented in section 2.7.2 used the nearest neighbor matching with three neighbors. Increas-
ing the number of neighbors in the nearest neighbor matching may involve a trade off between bias
and variance. Tables A.2 and A.3 in appendix A.3.1 presents the results from using five neighbors.
The results are very similar to the ones presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 in section 2.7.2.
2.8 Conclusion
Trade theory has emphasized within-firm productivity improvements from selling in interna-
tional markets. However, empirical work has mostly failed to identify gains to the firm from
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exports. Recent evidence from Chile on falling marginal costs of products, post entry into export
markets, suggests that the measure of productivity used could explain this absence of evidence.
I revisit the export-productivity question where I retrieve firm-level productivity measures that
account for pricing heterogeneity.
I find evidence that firm productivity grows faster after firms begin to export. Over a six-
year period, the difference in productivity growth between export entrants and their non exporter
counterparts is about 11 percentage points. Thus, I find that productivity improvements from
selling in international markets have largely been understated in the export-productivity empirical
literature.
I explore the export-R & D complementarity and export-import complementarity and decom-
pose gains from export entry from these two channels. Access to foreign markets to sell its products
allows firms to undertake activities foreign sourcing and R & D that improve its productivity. The
estimates suggest that about 15 percent of the differences in productivity growth is accounted for
by imports of intermediate inputs, while investment in R & D explains about 85 percent of this
difference in productivity growth. Thus, despite world R & D being concentrated in seven de-
veloped countries, I document that it is an important driver of productivity improvements even in
developing countries like India.
The earlier empirical papers which did not find evidence of productivity gains for exporters did
not account for firm variation in prices while estimating productivity. Some preliminary evidence
on India also indicates that revenue productivity (where revenue is deflated using industry deflators
to proxy for output) of exporters is more or less unchanged after firms begin exporting. This
suggests a need for a greater understanding of pricing behavior and mark-ups of exporters after
they begin selling in international markets. I leave this as a topic for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN CAPITAL GOODS
(CO-AUTHORED WITH IVAN T. KANDILOV AND ASLI LEBLEBICIOG˘LU)
3.1 Introduction
One of the often emphasized benefits of international trade is that it stimulates investment in
new technologies and thereby enhances productivity and stimulates economic growth (e.g. Keller
(2004)). For developing countries, investment in new technologies entails importing capital goods
since the production of capital equipment, as well as that of R&D intensive goods, is concentrated
in a few developed countries (Eaton and Kortum (2001)). In the last few decades, a large number
of developing countries and emerging economies have significantly reduced trade barriers in an
attempt to boost economic growth (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and India). However,
only a few studies have investigated the impact of trade liberalization on capital accumulation. In
this paper, we estimate the effect of the Indian trade liberalization in the 1990s on investment in
foreign capital goods using firm-level panel data from India. To our knowledge, our work provides
the first estimate of the elasticity of imported capital with respect to tariffs on capital equipment.
In our work, we distinguish between two kinds of investment the firm can make - investment
in imported capital goods and investment in domestic capital goods. Furthermore, in our empiri-
cal specification, we use input-output tables to construct three distinct tariff measures - tariffs on
capital goods, tariffs on intermediate inputs, and tariffs on final products. We estimate the impacts
of all three types of tariffs on firms investment decisions. By separating the effects of the tariff
on capital goods from that of intermediate inputs, we are able to evaluate the direct channel (via
reduction in the price of foreign capital) through which trade liberalization impacts investment de-
cisions. In doing so, we provide a direct estimate of the price elasticity of investment in imported
capital goods, and the gains from trade liberalization through reductions in the price of foreign
capital.
The 1990s trade liberalization episode in India provides a natural setting to study this question.
High tariff and non-tariff barriers characterized India’s trade policy regime in the decades preced-
ing the 1990s. The Indian economy experienced a balance of payment crisis in 1991. Support from
the IMF in the crisis was contingent on economic reforms. As part of the IMF conditions, trade
barriers on imports were significantly reduced in the years that followed. Between 1989 and 1997,
the average tariff rates on final goods, intermediate inputs and capital inputs declined by 50 to 65
percentage points, with considerable variation in reductions across industries.
We motivate the empirical specification by providing a theoretical framework in which monop-
olistically competitive firms import both capital goods and intermediate inputs and sell their output
domestically where they face competition from foreign producers. The dynamic problem of the
firm involves an investment decision, where domestic and foreign capital investment are imperfect
substitutes for each other. The firm maximizes the expected present value of the stream of profits
and optimally decides how much to invest in domestic and in foreign capital goods.1 The model
predicts that by reducing the relative price of imported capital goods, lower capital good tariffs
boost investment in foreign equipment. Similarly, a reduction in the intermediate input tariff leads
to an increase in investment, since lower input prices raise the marginal profitability of capital used
in production. On the other hand, lower output tariffs expose firms to greater foreign competition
and erode the marginal profitability of capital, which leads to lower investment in foreign capital
goods.
To test these predictions, we use a panel dataset on Indian manufacturing firms obtained from
the CMIE Prowess database for the period from 1990 to 1997. To identify the impacts of the three
types of tariffs on investment in foreign capital goods, we take advantage of India’s trade liberaliza-
tion in the early 1990s that led to plausibly exogenous variation in the tariffs across manufacturing
subsectors in that time period. Empirically, we estimate the reduced form dynamic investment
equation implied in our theoretical framework by using the system-GMM estimator developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The use of firm-level panel data allows
1The implications from our theoretical and empirical model are in terms of the investment rate for foreign capital
goods
(
IM
K
)
. We use investment and investment rate interchangeably throughout the paper.
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us to control for time invariant firm level unobservables relevant to the firms investment decision,
as well as time-varying unobservable shocks common to all firms. In addition, we are also able
to include other firm-level relevant factors, such as export status and mark-up, that influence how
tariff reductions might impact the firm’s investment decision.
Consistent with our theoretical framework, we find that the reduction in capital-good tariffs led
to an increase in investment in foreign capital goods, but not in domestic capital goods. Specifi-
cally, we show that a 10 percentage point decrease in the capital-good tariff led to a 9.44 percent
increase in the average firms investment rate in foreign capital goods. A similar 10 percentage
point reduction in the intermediate-input tariff led to a 6.11 percent increase in investment in for-
eign capital. Also in line with theory, we find that the reduction in the output tariff affected invest-
ment adversely. By increasing competition and lowering the marginal profitability of capital, a 10
percentage point reduction in the output tariff brought about a 4.72 percent decline in investment
in foreign capital. Combining the effects of the three types of tariffs, we find that the trade liberal-
ization in India resulted in a net increase of 62.31 percent in the manufacturing sector investment
rate over the course of our sample period (1990-1997). Hence, given the average investment rate(
IM
K
)
of 0.036 over the sample period, our results imply that the trade liberalization increased the
investment rate to 0.058.
We also find that there is substantial heterogeneity across firms in how they responded to re-
ductions in tariffs. We find that the net impact of the trade liberalization ranged between 4 and
167 percent increase in investment rates across different industries, and that firms in the middle
of the productivity and size distributions benefitted the most from lower tariffs on capital goods.
Moreover, we show that following the reductions in output tariffs, firms with greater market power
lowered investment in foreign capital goods more aggressively, and firms in industries with more
scope for product differentiation and quality upgrading (Khandelwal (2010)) lowered investment
less. Additionally, we find that the effects of lower capital goods and lower intermediate input
tariffs were more pronounced for exporters.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that evaluates the impact of trade liberalization
on capital accumulation. The estimates we obtain from investment Euler equations complement
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the findings in Bas and Berthou (2013), who show that reductions in tariffs on intermediate inputs
increased the probability of importing capital goods for firms in the middle range of the produc-
tivity distribution. Moreover, our paper extends the results in Kandilov and Leblebicioglu (2012)
on the impact of trade liberalization on firm investment in Mexico. In their paper, they treat all
investment as domestic investment and examine how lower tariffs influence investment decisions
through the marginal profitability of capital as a result of greater competition and lower costs of
variable inputs. In this paper, we additionally analyze the direct effect of changes in the price of
imported capital goods (through changes in tariffs on capital equipment) on investment in foreign
capital goods. Hence, we provide the first direct evidence showing that the largest gains from trade
liberalization for capital accumulation occurs through the reduction in the price of foreign capital.2
Our work is also related to the broader literature on trade liberalization and productivity. Evi-
dence from Colombia, Chile, Indonesia and India suggest that lower tariffs lead to efficiency gains
for firms. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Amiti and Konings (2007) find positive effects
of both lower input and output tariffs on productivity in India and Indonesia, respectively. Fer-
nandes (2007), Muendler (2004), and Pavcnik (2002) show that tariff liberalization led to higher
firm-level productivity in Colombia, Brazil, and Chile, respectively. Tybout and Westbrook (1995)
suggest that average costs fell in most industries following the Mexican trade liberalization. Simi-
larly, Tybout, De Melo, and Corbo (1991) find evidence that Chilean industries which experienced
relatively large reductions in protection also experienced relatively large improvements in average
efficiency levels.3 One mechanism through which trade liberalization can improve efficiency is
by lowering the cost of investing in highly efficient, R& D-intensive capital goods that are pro-
duced in a short-list of technologically advanced countries (see Table 3.1 for the list of countries
2Previous studies on trade policy reform and aggregate investment have been cross country or industry level studies
which have analyzed the impact of output tariff reductions. See Wacziarg and Welch (2008) and Ibarra (1995) for
examples.
3Also, there exists a literature that relates exporting opportunities to investment. For example, using data from
Mexico during 1994-2004, Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) show that future exporters increase product quality (unit
value) and investment before they start servicing the foreign market. Similarly, Alvarez and Lopez (2005) use data
from Chile and present evidence that exporters invest more, perhaps to upgrade product quality, even before they enter
the foreign market compared to firms that supply to the domestic market alone.
46
Table 3.1: Trading partner share of total imported capital
Rank Trading Partner Imported Capital (Percent of Total)
1 U.S. 20.14
2 Japan 16.80
3 Germany 16.73
4 U.K. 6.60
5 Singapore 4.98
6 France 4.96
7 Italy 4.63
8 Switzerland 3.10
9 Korea 2.18
10 Taiwan 1.91
All Other 17.98
Total 100.00
Note: Average percentage of total (over the sample period from 1990 to 1997)
India imported capital goods from during our sample period). Our paper provides insight into this
mechanism and complements the findings in Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2014), who use a
neoclassical growth model with Ricardian trade to show that trade in capital goods has quantita-
tively important effects on economic development.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the trade liberalization
experience in India. In Section 3.3, we develop a theoretical framework which motivates the
empirical specification. In Section 3.4 we describe the data and how we construct the tariffs of
interest. Section 3.5 presents our empirical model, and section 3.6 discusses our findings. Finally,
section 3.7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Background on Tariff Liberalization
India adopted a highly restrictive trade policy post-independence. It was characterized by high
tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports across industries. In the 1980s, the government began the
process of gradual deregulation of the economy in order to promote exports. However, import tariff
rates continued to be high. In 1990, the average tariff rate was over 90 percent while the maximum
4In particular, Mutreja et al. (2014) find that cross-country income differences would decline by more than 50
percent if trade barriers are eliminated.
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tariff rates in some industries were close to 300 percent.
A combination of several factors contributed to the balance of payment crisis of 1991. The
conflict in the Middle East resulted in high oil prices and a fall in worker remittances from abroad.
There was a decline in export growth due to slow growth in India’s major trading partners. This
combined with political uncertainty led to a loss in investor confidence and large capital outflows
from the country (see Cerra and Saxena (2002)). Foreign exchange reserves reached dangerously
low levels. The Government requested a standby arrangement with the IMF in August 1991. IMF
aid was conditional on India undertaking the process of liberalizing its economy. One of the
conditions was the reduction in the levels and dispersion of tariffs on imports. Trade barriers on
imports into India were reduced in the years that followed.
By 1997, import tariffs were cut to less than half of 1992 levels. Figure 3.1 shows the evolu-
tion of mean tariff levels on final goods, intermediate inputs and capital goods between 1989 and
2001. In addition to a reduction in average tariff levels, the standard deviation of final-good tariffs,
intermediate-input tariffs and capital-input tariffs also reduced over the period as can be seen in
Figure 3.2. Thus, industries with the highest tariff levels experienced the largest cuts.5 Table 3.9
provides the details of the changes in tariffs on final goods, intermediate inputs and capital goods
across all two digit manufacturing industries. While there was variation in 1990 tariff levels across
industries, the table convincingly shows that the tariff reductions in final goods, intermediate inputs
and capital inputs occurred across the board in all industry groups.
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.9 also show that most of the reductions in tariffs took place in the years
immediately following the crisis between 1992 and 1997. While tariff cuts continued into the
second half of the period (between 1997 and 2001), they had more or less leveled off in the later
years. Tariffs on final goods dropped from 85 percent to 42 percent between 1992 and 1997 and
fell further to 34 percent by 2001. Similarly, tariffs on capital goods fell from 83 percent to 34
percent between 1992 and 1997, and further to 30 percent by 2001 while tariffs on intermediate
5Average Tariffs for manufacturing was calculated as the simple average of tariffs of all two digit manufacturing
industries, where the tariffs on the two digit industries was the simple average of all four digit industries within each
two digit industry. The standard deviation of tariffs was calculated across five digit industry levels, the lowest industry
classification.
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inputs reduced from 72 to 32 percent between 1992 and 1997, and to 29 percent by 2001. These
patterns are displayed across the major industries.
Figure 3.1: Average Tariff Rates (In Percent)
Figure 3.2: Standard Deviation of Tariffs
We confine our study to the early part of the trade liberalization episode i.e., until 1997. We
do so because of concerns about trade policy being endogenously determined in the period after
1997. The literature on the political economy of trade policy has recognized that groups of firms
and workers can influence governments when trade policy is set or that governments may protect
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industries with low productivity or investment levels (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman
(1994); Hillman (1982)). In India, economic policy is broadly set according to five-year plans.
Trade policy was determined in the Second Plan (1956-1961) and had not changed over the years
even as industries evolved over time. Given the earlier inward looking economic policies and the
crisis of 1991, Hasan et al. (2007) argue that tariff reforms in 1992 came as a surprise and were
externally driven.
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) use the Annual Survey of Industry data to check whether the
changes in tariffs between 1987 and 1997 across industries were motivated by political considera-
tions. They use a range of industry characteristics such as employment, wages and average factory
size to capture electoral power, industry concentration measures and political pressure groups and
find no correlation between tariff reductions and pre-reform industry characteristics in 1987. By
the end of the Eight Plan (1992-1997), external pressures had abated. India continued with trade
reforms in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002). Trade policy in later years could have been influenced
by political factors. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) find evidence that in the years after 1997,
tariff cuts may have been more selective to protect less efficient industries. Thus, similar to Gold-
berg et al. (2010), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and
Pavcnik (2012), we focus on the first half of the period of trade reforms until 1997.
We extend the analysis on trade endogeneity in Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) by providing
additional evidence that tariff levels between 1992-1997 were uncorrelated with the firm outcome
measures we consider in this paper. One potential issue that may affect the reliability of our
estimates of the impact of tariff liberalization on firm-level investment decisions is if the Indian
policy makers chose import-protection measures in response to industry-level investment rates in
domestic and foreign capital goods. If this was indeed the case, we would expect current investment
rates in domestic and foreign capital goods to predict future measures of import protection.
We calculate industry level investment rates in foreign and domestic capital as the sales weighted
average of firm-level investment rates in foreign and domestic capital goods respectively.6 We then
6Here, industry refers to the four digit industry level.
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Table 3.2: Trade Policy Endogeneity: Current Trade Policy (Tariffs) and Past Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Output Tariff Intermediate Tariff Capital Tariff
Panel A
Investment in Foreign Capital Goods -0.775 -0.201 0.392
(1.331) (0.686) (0.425)
Observations 673 673 673
R-squared 0.814 0.903 0.945
Panel B
Investment in Domestic Capital Goods 0.059 -0.001 0.237
(0.225) (0.142) (0.143)
Observations 673 673 673
R-squared 0.814 0.903 0.945
Notes: Panel A presents the panel regressions of current trade policy tool on lagged investment rate in foreign capital goods. Panel B presents the
regressions of current trade policy tool on lagged investment rate in domestic capital goods. Estimations include controls for years and four-digit
industry and are weighted by the number of firms in each four-digit industry in each particular year. Standard errors are robust and they are
clustered at the four-digit industry level.
regress industry-level output tariffs, intermediate-input tariffs and capital-good tariffs in period
t + 1 on industry-level domestic investment rates in period t. The results are presented in Table
3.2, Panel A. We also regress regress industry-level output tariffs, intermediate-input tariffs and
capital-good tariffs in period t + 1 on industry level investment rates in imported capital goods
during period t and present the results in Table 3.2, Panel B. We control for industry and year fixed
effects in these regressions and weight each industry by the number of firms in the industry in the
particular year.
The results show that for the period of our study, none of the three tariff rates (on final output,
intermediate inputs and capital goods) depend on industry level investment rates in either domestic
or foreign capital goods. None of the six estimated coefficients are statistically significant, with a
mix of positive and negative estimates.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
In order to motivate the empirical specification, and to illustrate how tariffs on capital goods,
intermediate inputs and final output can affect the investment decisions of a firm, we present a sim-
ple model of investment. We consider the investment problem of a monopolistically competitive
firm that imports some of its capital, in addition to some of its variable inputs of production, and
sells its output in the domestic market, where it faces foreign competition. Investment in domestic
and imported capital goods are imperfect substitutes. At the beginning of period t, the firm opti-
mally chooses the level of variable inputs, output price, and how much to invest in the two types
of capital.
We assume that individuals consume a continuum of imperfectly substitutable domestic and
foreign goods (x(z) and x∗(z), respectively), and the consumption basket is formed by the follow-
ing CES aggregator:
Xt =
(∫ a
0
x(z)
θ−1
θ dz +
∫ 1
a
x∗(z)
θ−1
θ dz
) θ
θ−1
(3.1)
where Xt is the aggregate final good. The aggregate price index, Pt is given by:
Pt =
[∫ a
0
pt(z)
1−θ dz +
∫ 1
a
(
τOt p
∗
t (z)
)1−θ
dz
] 1
1−θ
(3.2)
where pt(z) is the price of a domestic variety z in the interval [0,a) , and p∗t (z) is the price of a
foreign competitor z∗ in the interval [a,1]. The effective price of a foreign good is τOt p
∗
t (z), where
τOt is the output tariff levied on foreign products.
The demand faced by the firm selling its output in an imperfectly competitive market is given
by
xit =
(
pit
Pt
)−θ
Xt (3.3)
where xit is the demand for firm i’s product, pit is the price the firm charges, and Pt and Xt are
the aggregate price level and aggregate demand, respectively, as defined above. The parameter
θ > 1 denotes the price elasticity of demand, which depends upon the substitutability between the
varieties.
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Firm i enters period t with Kit−1 units of capital. Given the demand function and the amount
of capital the firm enters with, the firm optimally chooses the price of its output, in addition to
the level of domestic and foreign variable inputs. Hence, at the beginning of each period, firm i
maximizes profits conditional on all available information:
Πit = max
pit,Lit,L∗it,
[
xitpit − wtLit −
(
τ It w
∗
t
)
L∗it | Ωt−
]
(3.4)
subject to
xit = F (Kit−1, Lit, L∗it)
where xit is the product demand given in equation (3.3); Lit and L∗it are the domestic and foreign
inputs with prices (in units of the domestic currency) wt and w∗t , respectively, and τ
I
t is the tariff
imposed on imported inputs; and Ωt− is the information set available at the beginning of period t.
In every period, the firm also decides how much to invest in capital stock. Due to a one period
time-to-build lag, the new capital resulting from total investment in period t becomes productive
in the following period t + 1. The firm chooses total investment expenditures Iit to maximize the
expected present value of current and future profits subject to the standard capital accumulation
equation.
Vit(Kit−1) = max
Iit
{Πit −G (Kit−1, Iit)− Iit + βEt [Vit+1(Kit)]} (3.5)
subject to
Kit = (1− δ)Kit−1 + Iit (3.6)
where Πit be the optimal variable profit of firm i from the optimization problem (3.4), β is the
discount factor, δ is the rate of depreciation, and G (Kit−1, Iit) denotes the cost of altering the
capital stock, which leads to a loss of a fraction of total investment. The first order conditions of
the firm’s problem (Appendix B.1) yield the Euler equation:
1 +
∂G (Kit−1, Iit)
∂Iit
= βEt
[
∂Πit+1
∂Kit
− ∂G (Kit, Iit+1)
∂Kit
+ (1− δ)
(
1 +
∂G (Kit, Iit+1)
∂Iit+1
)]
(3.7)
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This implies that along the optimal path, the marginal cost of investing in a new unit of capital
equals the present discounted value of the marginal return to capital. The marginal return depends
on the marginal profitability of capital (net of adjustment costs) and the value of undepreciated
capital.
Total investment is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of purchases of do-
mestic and imported capital goods:
Iit =
[
(1− µi) 1ω I
ω−1
ω
Dit + µ
1
ω
i I
ω−1
ω
Mit
] ω
ω−1
(3.8)
where IDit and IMit are the purchases of domestic and imported capital goods, ω > 0 is the elastic-
ity of substitution between them, and µi is the weight on imported capital goods in the investment
basket.7 We normalize the price of the investment basket to 1, and denote the relative price of im-
ported capital goods with τKt PMt, where τ
K
t is the tariff imposed on foreign capital goods. From
the firm’s cost-minimization problem (Appendix B.2), we obtain the following demand function
for imported capital goods:
IMit = µi
(
τKt PMt
)−ω
Iit (3.9)
This demand function reveals the direct mechanism through which tariffs on capital goods affect
investment in foreign capital goods. All else constant, a reduction in the tariffs on capital goods,
τKt , lowers the relative price of investment in foreign capital, and thereby increases the demand for
it.
Output tariffs and the tariffs on intermediate inputs affect investment in foreign capital goods
through the marginal profitability of capital. In order to characterize the marginal profitability of
capital, ∂Πit+1
∂Kit
, we use the first order conditions from the optimization problem (3.4) and assume
that the production function, F (.), is homogeneous of degree one. We differentiate the resulting
7We assume that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital goods is constant across firms
and across time, but the weights, µi, are firm-specific.
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profit function to obtain the expression for the marginal profitability of capital (Appendix B.3):
∂Πit
∂Kit−1
=
[
1
Kit−1
(
xitpit
ψ
− wtLit −
(
τ It w
∗
t
)
L∗it
)
| Ωt−
]
(3.10)
where ψ = θ
θ−1 denotes the mark-up (price-to-cost margin). We can see from equation (3.10) that a
reduction in input tariffs lowers costs and raises the marginal profitability of capital and investment.
From equation (3.10), we can also see how output tariffs affect investment decisions. Changes
in output tariffs affect marginal profitability of capital through changes in foreign competitors’
prices and as a result, the firm’s revenue, xitpit.
∂ (xitpit)
∂τOt
=
∂ (xitpit)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂τOt
= θ
xitpit
τOt
(
1
Pt
)1−θ [∫ 1
a
(τOt p
∗(z))1−θ) dz
]
> 0 (3.11)
The positive relationship in expression (3.11) between sales and output tariffs implies that a reduc-
tion in τOt lowers the effective price individuals pay on foreign varieties, and thereby reduces the
demand for firm i’s product. As a result, the reduction in output tariff lowers marginal profitability
of capital and investment.
Equation (3.10) reveals an additional important factor that mediates the relationship between
investment and changes in tariffs. The firm’s mark-up, ψ which is closely linked to the degree of
competition, as well as the industry structure, plays an important role in determining the sensitivity
of investment to changes in tariffs. The higher the mark-up ratio, the more adversely affected will
a firm be by a reduction in output tariffs due to the import competition that lower tariffs generate.
On the other hand, the reduction in output tariffs may not affect low mark-up firms as much, since
they have already been exposed to ample domestic competition.8
To characterize the investment Euler equation (3.7), we adopt the standard convex adjustment
cost assumption, and adopt the following functional form:
G (Kt−1, It) =
γ
2
(
It
Kt−1
− I¯
K
)2
Kt−1 (3.12)
8Since ψ = θθ−1 ,
∂ψ
∂θ < 0 and
∂2(xitpit/ψi)
∂τOt ∂θ
< 0, we will have that ∂
2(xitpit/ψi)
∂τOt ∂ψ
> 0
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where γ is the adjustment cost parameter, and I¯
K
is the steady-state value of the investment rate.
We can obtain the fully-parametrized investment equation by substituting the partial derivatives of
the adjustment cost function in equation (3.12), and the marginal profitability of capital in equation
(3.10) into the Euler equation in (3.7). Furthermore, by combining the demand for imported capital
goods in equation (3.9) with the Euler equation, we can obtain the decision rule for investment in
foreign capital. Given the functional forms, this generates a non-linear equation in the variables
of interest. In order to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients and to obtain an equation
that can be used as the basis for our empirical specification, we linearize the Euler equation using
a first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state. After linearizing and rearranging the
terms, we obtain the following investment equation:
IMit
Kit−1
= Et
[
φ0 + φ1
IMit+1
Kit
+ φ2
Sit+1
Kit
− φ3Zit+1
Kit
− φ4Z
∗
it+1
Kit
+ φ5
(
τKt+1PMt+1
)− φ6 (τKt PMt)]
(3.13)
where Sit+1 is the value of total sales (xit+1pit+1), Zit+1 is the cost of domestic inputs (wt+1Lit+1),
and Z∗it+1 is the cost of imported inputs (τ
I
t+1w
∗
t+1L
∗
it+1). The φ’s are positive constants that are
functions of the structural parameters of the model. See the Appendix for the details of the Taylor
approximation and the expressions for the φ’s.9 Equation (3.13), which presents the first-order
approximation of the model, shows that the investment process depends on future investment, ex-
pected sales, expected domestic costs and imported input costs, as well as the current and expected
prices of imported capital. The coefficients on the tariff terms suggest that if the current tariff rates
on capital goods are high, then the firm’s investment in foreign capital goods during that period
will be low. At the same time, if the firm expects tariff rates to be higher in the future, keeping
current rates constant, they will choose to invest more today to circumvent the higher rates in the
future.
9We can similarly obtain a linear equation for total investment or investment in domestic capital goods, which can
be used to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on total investment or on investment in domestic capital goods.
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3.4 Data
The firm-level variables are from Prowess, a panel data of Indian firms. The data are collected
by the Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE), and contain information on listed and
unlisted firm and accounts for about 70 percent of the organized industrial activity.10 In addition to
the variables commonly found in most firm-level data-sets (capital stock, sales, wages, expenditure
on intermediate inputs etc.), the data also contain information on the foreign exchange transactions
of firms, including the imports of capital goods. This information, along with the capital stock
series allows us to construct the domestic and foreign capital investment measures for the firms.
Firms are classified into industries based on the 2008 National Industrial Classification (NIC).
The NIC 2008 classification is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
Rev.4. We use data on manufacturing firms (NIC two digits, 10 through 31). For the period of the
study, we have data on 9, 486 firm-year observations. The 2, 512 unique firms in the data-set are
classified into 99 four digit industry groups. To construct firm-level total investment expenditures,
we take the annual difference in the current value of the gross fixed assets, which measures the
value of the firm’s capital. As imports of capital goods measure investment expenditures in for-
eign capital, we subtract imports of capital goods from total investment expenditures to calculate
investment in domestic capital goods.
As shown in Section 3.3, firm’s market power could determine how investment rates respond
to changes in tariffs. Firms with high market power can be more sensitive to reductions in output
tariffs due to increased competition from abroad, while they can also be less sensitive to changes
in intermediate input tariffs. We use use firm-level markups as a proxy for market power in our
estimations. We construct the markup variable using the information provided in Prowess. Fol-
lowing Campa and Goldberg (1999), we define the average markup, ψi, for firm i (averaged over
our sample period from 1990 to 1997) as
ψi =
value of salesi + ∆inventoriesi
payrolli + cost of materialsi
(3.14)
10The data have been used in several papers including Goldberg et al. (2010)and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
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We examine whether the scope for quality differentiation within an industry impacts how firms
respond to reductions in output tariffs. Firms belonging to industries with “long” quality ladders or
greater scope for product differentiation may be less sensitive to reductions in output tariffs since
firms may upgrade quality in order to not lose out on the marginal profitability. The data on quality
ladders, a proxy for vertical differentiation, are from Khandelwal (2010). The variable is a time
invariant industry specific measure. The data were made available at the four-digit SIC (rev.1987)
classification and were matched to the NIC 2008 industrial classification.
We supplement the firm-level data with information on policy variables. The data on final
goods tariffs are from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). These data were made available based
on the NIC 1987 three digit classification and were matched to NIC 2008 four digit industries.11
We use the data on output tariffs to construct input tariffs similar to Amiti and Konings (2007) by
passing output tariff through the input-output (I-O) matrix. However, unlike Amiti and Konings
(2007) who construct an aggregate input tariff, we construct separate tariffs for intermediate inputs
and capital goods. Classification of Industries into intermediate and capital goods was done based
on the United Nations classification by Broad Economic Categories. We use the Input-Output
Transactions Table from India for 1993 − 1994 to obtain the weights for constructing the inter-
mediate inputs and capital inputs tariffs. Sectors 77 − 84 and 87 − 96 are classified as capital
goods industries and the remaining sectors up until sector 98 are classified as intermediate inputs
industries. The sectors from the I-O Table were matched to the NIC Industries and the input tariffs
were constructed as follows:
τ jkt =
∑
s
wjskτst (3.15)
where j refers to capital or intermediate inputs, τ jkt is the j input tariff of industry k in period t,
wjsk is the value share of industry s in output of industry k and τst is the output tariff of industry s
in period t. The weights are constructed from the I-O coefficient matrix of 1993− 1994 such that∑
sw
j
sk = 1 for each j. See appendix B.5 for details.
11The NIC 1987 three digit industries correspond to NIC 2008 four digit industries. However, because of reclassi-
fication of industrial groups over time, in some cases, they were matched to five digit industries.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Investment in Foreign Capital Goods
(
IFijt
Kijt−1
)
0.036 0.187 0 10.05
Investment in Domestic Capital Goods
(
IDijt
Kijt−1
)
0.243 0.669 0 22.62
Sales
(
Sijt
Kijt−1
)
3.298 6.114 0.004 409.9
Cash-Flow
(
Cijt
Kijt−1
)
-0.248 0.869 -32.62 3.956
Average Markup (ψi) 0.618 0.088 0 1.128
Output Tariff
(
τOjt
100
)
0.594 0.244 0.088 3.263
Intermediate Input Tariff
(
τIjt
100
)
0.543 0.182 0.142 1.115
Capital Input Tariff
(
τKjt
100
)
0.532 0.198 0.260 1.274
License 0.113 0.273 0 1
FDI 0.579 0.419 0 1
Quality ladder 2.283 0.299 1.219 3.325
Herfindahl index 0.141 0.149 0.016 1
Notes: The number of observations is 9, 486 and the number of firms is 2, 512.
During the trade liberalization episode in the 1990s, the Indian government also introduced
other industrial reforms. These policy changes include liberalizing the licensing requirements (for
setting up and expanding capacity) and lowering of entry barriers to foreign investment. In order
to identify the distinct effects of trade liberalization, we control for these concurrent reforms in our
empirical specifications. The data on these policy variables are from Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011). The data are coded between 0 and 1 and are industry and time varying. They represent
the share of products in an industry subject to licensing requirements (License) and the share of
products which have automatic approval for foreign investment (FDI).
The data on trading partner share of total imported capital goods presented in Table 3.1 are from
the World Bank Trade, Production and Protection (1976-2004) database. Table 3.3 presents the
summary statistics for investment rates, and all the explanatory variables (both firm-level variables
and policy variables) used in our specifications.
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3.5 Empirical Investment Equation and Estimation
The theoretical framework in Section 3.3 motivates the relationship between investment and
different types of tariffs. For brevity, we refer to the tariffs on intermediate inputs as input tariffs
and the tariffs on capital goods as capital tariffs. The theoretical framework illustrates how capital,
input and output tariffs affect investment decisions, and it also suggests other firm-specific deter-
minants of investment (such as sales and costs). Because our main goal is to estimate the impact
of trade liberalization on investment, instead of focusing on the structural process, we estimate a
reduced form equation for investment in foreign capital goods.12
We start by estimating the following baseline specification, which takes equation (3.13) as its
basis, and focuses on the main effect of tariffs on investment:
IMijt
Kijt−1
= α1
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
+ α2
Sijt
Kijt−1
+ α3
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
+ α4
Cijt
Kijt−1
+ α5
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
+ α6τ
K
jt + α7τ
I
jt + α8τ
O
jt
+ υi + ηt + εijt (3.16)
where IMijt
Kijt−1
denotes the investment rate in imported capital goods (IM ) for firm i, in industry j in
year t; and Sijt
Kijt−1
and Cijt
Kijt−1
are the firm’s total sales and cash flow, respectively, normalized by
its capital stock.13 The terms τKjt , τ
I
jt, and τ
O
jt denote the capital, input, and output tariff measures
for industry j, in year t, respectively. Note that we include industry specific input, capital and
output tariffs as measures of protection in the baseline specification (3.16) simultaneously. It is
important to include all of these three measures together in the model because they are positively
correlated (see Figure 3.1). As we demonstrate in the results section, if we exclude one or more
from the specification, for example if we only include output tariffs, omitted variable bias becomes
a potential issue.
12In their review of the empirical literature on microeconometric models of investment, Bond and Van Reenen
(2008) note that this type of reduced form model can be interpreted as representing an empirical approximation to the
underlying investment process.
13The normalization by capital stock naturally arises in a model with quadratic adjustment costs, and it allows us to
control for the size of the firm.
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In order to address some of the econometric issues in estimating the empirical relationship be-
tween investment and these tariff measures, we modify equation (3.13) in a number of ways. First,
following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), we include cash flow as a proxy for financing
constraints, which arise due to capital market imperfections. Cash flow can be an important de-
terminant of investment for Indian firms, since firms might find it difficult to smooth investment
via external capital markets.14 Empirically, cash flow is constructed as the difference between
sales and total costs, adjusted for taxes and depreciation.15 Because costs and cash flow are highly
correlated, we include only cash flow in the specification in order to minimize collinearity prob-
lems. Second, to allow for serial correlation in sales and cash flow, we include the current and the
lagged values of those variables. Moreover, we include the lagged investment rate to control for
the autocorrelation that may arise due to adjustment costs. Since the adjustment costs presumably
depends on all investment expenditures, in more exhaustive specifications, we include the lagged
investment rates for both foreign and domestic capital goods.
The specification also includes firm specific fixed effects, υi, that capture the time-invariant
plant-level determinants of investment, as well as year dummies, ηt, that capture aggregate economy-
wide fluctuations. Macroeconomic factors common to all firms, such as changes in the exchange
rates, will be captured by these year effects. However, firms in different industries might face dif-
ferent economic conditions or different productivity trends. In order to allow for industry-specific
productivities, we include interaction terms between two-digit industry dummies and a linear time-
trend. Moreover, in some specifications, we include interaction terms between the time trend and a
full set of state dummies in order to control for economic trends that differ across various regions.
Finally, we assume that the error term, εijt, is i.i.d with E(εijt) = 0.
In order to analyze the heterogeneity in the investment behavior of firms, we augment the
baseline specification (3.16) in several ways. First, to check how the impact of trade liberalization
14Examples of previous work that have shown the importance of financing constraints for investment in developing
countries include Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996), Love (2003), and Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004).
15Total costs include domestic and imported material costs, as well as labor costs and costs of industrial and non-
industrial services.
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on investment depends on the firm’s mark-up, we include an interaction term between the average
mark-up of the firm and the output tariff measure. As discussed in Section 3.3, a reduction in
output tariffs can reduce investment more in high mark-up firms, as they begin to face more stiff
competition from abroad and experience a decrease in marginal profitability. Hence, we expect
this interaction term to intensify effects of the output tariffs.
Next, we examine whether the scope for quality differentiation within an industry impacts how
a firm responds to increased competition. We include an interaction term betwen output tariffs
and the quality ladder index and an interaction term between the Herfindahl index of domestic
competition and the quality ladder index to examine how the impact of greater foreign and do-
mestic competition on firm investment in foreign capital goods is mediated by the level of vertical
differentiation in the industry.
We then move on to some sub-sample analysis with respect to importing and exporting status
of the firm. We recognize that imported intermediate goods may be complementary to imported
capital goods. Therefore, importers of intermediates might not only respond to reductions in input
tariffs more strongly, but also respond to reductions in capital tariffs more intensely. To exam-
ine this, we estimate the baseline specification for the sub-sample of firms that are importers of
intermediate inputs. We also provide sub-sample analysis for exporters versus non-exporters.
We also analyze the the heterogeneity in the impact of lower tariffs on investment in imported
capital goods based on where firms are located in the productivity distribution. We classify firms
into four quartiles based on their productivity levels and generate dummies. We then interact these
dummy variables with the tariff measures, and estimate an augmented investment equation with
twelve tariff interaction terms (three tariff measures times the quartile dummies).
We estimate the dynamic investment equation (3.16) and the augmented specifications using
the system-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This
estimator for panel data sets with short time dimension addresses the potential biases that arise
from the correlation between the firm fixed effects, υi, and the lagged dependent variable,
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
,
as well as the endogeneity of sales, Sijt
Kijt−1
, and cash flow, Cijt
Kijt−1
. The system-GMM estimator
combines the first-difference equations, whose regressors are instrumented by their lagged levels,
62
with equations in levels, whose regressors are instrumented by their first-differences.16 We treat
all of the firm-specific variables as endogenous, and use lagged values dated t − 2 and t − 3 as
the GMM-type instruments.17 We also include lags 2 and 3 of total intermediate costs and other
expenses in the set of GMM-type instruments. We employ and report the second order serial
correlation tests and the Sargan-Hansen tests of over-identification to check the validity of our
instruments. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the NIC five-digit industry
level.18
3.6 Results
We start by estimating the impact of capital, input and output tariffs on firm’s investment in for-
eign capital goods in India, as specified in equation (3.16). In this first set of results, we evaluate
the average impact of the trade liberalization on investment in imported capital goods, and illus-
trate how changes in capital, input and output protection measures affect investment differently, as
our theoretical framework suggests. Next, we present results from alternative specifications that in-
clude past tariffs, and specifications for total investment, and investment in domestic capital goods.
In doing so, we show that the significant gains from trade liberalization emerged from investment
in foreign capital goods, and not domestic capital goods. In subsection 3.6.3, we document the
importance of the firm’s market power, and the the product market’s scope for differentiation in
mediating the effects of trade liberalization on investment in foreign capital. In subsection 3.6.4,
we analyze whether exporting status and importing intermediate inputs matter for investment in
imported capital goods. Next, we discuss the heterogeneity in the impact of the trade liberaliza-
tion across firms of different size an productivity levels in subsection 3.6.5. Finally, in subsection
3.6.6, we evaluate the overall impact of the trade liberalization in India on the investment in foreign
16The system-GMM estimator builds on the difference-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), which uses
only the differenced equations, instrumented by the lagged levels of the regressors. If the regressors are persistent, then
their lagged levels are shown to be weak instruments. See Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
for more details. To avoid this drawback of the difference-GMM estimator, we opt for the system-GMM estimator.
17In some specifications, including lagged value dated t − 2 of the investment rate as a GMM-type instrument
violates the validity of the Sargan-Hansen tests of over-identification. In those cases, we include only the lagged value
dated t− 3 of the investment rate in the instrument set.
18All the estimations and tests were done using the xtabond2 command in Stata.
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capital goods at the aggregate and industry levels.
3.6.1 Main Effects of Trade Liberalization on Investment in Foreign Capital Goods
Table 3.4 presents the results from our baseline specification (3.16) for investment in foreign
capital goods, which includes firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry specific time trends.19
In order to highlight the importance of distinguishing between tariffs on capital goods, intermediate
inputs, and final products to evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on investment decisions, first
we present the results from a specification with just the output tariff measure. In the second and
third columns, we progressively add input and capital goods tariff measures, and evaluate the direct
and indirect effects of trade liberalization on investment decisions.
Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows that, as our theoretical model suggests, the coefficient on out-
put tariffs is positive, but it’s not statistically significant. The positive coefficient suggests that a
reduction in output tariffs might lower the marginal profitability of capital due to intensified for-
eign competition, and thereby lower investment in imported capital. When we add input tariffs in
column (2), the coefficient on output tariffs increases slightly but remains insignificant. The neg-
ative coefficient on input tariffs, albeit being small and insignificant, suggests that a reduction in
input tariffs may increase investment in foreign capital by lowering the cost of intermediate inputs
and therefore increasing the marginal profitability of capital. Next, we include tariffs on capital
goods in column (3). As expected, the coefficient on capital-good tariffs is negative and it is highly
significant, providing direct evidence for the notion that trade liberalization allows firms to invest
more in foreign capital by making them cheaper. The coefficient on output and input tariffs remain
insignificant.
In column (4), we augment the specification with a measure of licenses, which measures the
share of products that are subject to an industrial license, and with a measure of openness to
19Notes on Table 3.4: Number of observations is 9,486 and number of firms is 2,512. The estimates and standard
errors are obtained from the two-step system GMM procedure with the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction.
Standard errors are clustered at the 5 digit NIC level, and are in parentheses. All firm-specific regressors are treated
as endogenous. A set of year effects and industry-specific time trends are included in all specifications. The p-
values for the Hansen over-identification test and the second order serial correlation tests are reported. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Lags 2 and 3 of the investment rate, sales and cash-flow
intermediate input costs and other operating costs are included as GMM-type instruments. All industry-level variables
are included as IV-type instruments.
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Table 3.4: Main Effects of Trade Liberalization on Investment in Foreign Capital Goods
Dependent Variable: IMijt
Kijt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged foreign capital investment
(
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Sales
(
Sijt
Kijt−1
)
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged sales
(
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.001* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash-flow
(
Cijt
Kijt−1
)
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Lagged cash-flow
(
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.011 0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Output tariff
(
τOjt
100
)
0.010 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.016* 0.017*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Input tariff
(
τIjt
100
)
-0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.022
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
Capital goods tariff
(
τKjt
100
)
-0.032*** -0.028** -0.030*** -0.034**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014)
License -0.011* -0.011* -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FDI -0.013 -0.012 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Lagged domestic capital investment
(
IDijt−1
Kijt−2
)
-0.007*
(0.004)
Regional time trends no no no no yes yes
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.638 0.585 0.654 0.513 0.642 0.715
1st order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
2nd order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.251 0.252 0.250 0.245 0.225 0.209
65
FDI, both of which are obtained from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). The results show that
the coefficients on the tariff measures remain very similar to the estimates presented in column
(3). While the coefficients on both licence coverage and FDI openness are negative, only the
former is significant. This result suggests that the higher the share of products subject to licensing
in an industry, the lower the investment in imported capital goods will be. In column (5), we
further augment the specification with state-specific time-trends, capturing, for example, different
dynamic productivity trends across the states in India.20 Accounting for the state-level variation
increases the precision of the estimates, and yields a coefficient on output tariffs that is significant
at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on capital goods tariffs remain highly significant at the 1
percent level when we include state-specific time trends, and the coefficient on input tariffs remain
insignificant.
In the last column, we augment the general specification in column (5) with the lagged in-
vestment rate for domestic capital. A high level of investment in domestic capital goods in the
previous year can lead the firm to invest less (more) in imported capital goods if the two types of
goods are substitutes (complements). The negative and significant (at the 10 percent level) esti-
mate in column (6) suggest that foreign and domestic capital goods can be substitutes, and as such,
large domestic capital investments can be followed by smaller investments in foreign capital. The
estimates also show that the coefficients on tariff measures increases slightly in magnitude when
we account for past investment in domestic capital.
Focusing on the most general specification in column (6) of Table 3.4, we can quantify the
impact of reductions in tariffs on investment in imported capital goods. The estimated coefficient
on the capital goods tariffs of -0.034 indicates that the semi-elasticity of the investment rate, IMijt
Kijt−1
,
with respect to capital goods tariffs is 0.00944 at the sample mean, which suggests that a 10 per-
centage point reduction in the capital goods tariffs leads to a 9.44 percent increase in investment
in foreign capital goods.21 Although the coefficient on input tariffs of -0.022 is not statistically
20The state indicators in our data is that they are based on the state where the firm head-quarter is located, which
might not necessarily be the location where the investment and the production take place.
21The semi-elasticity of the investment rate, IMijtKijt−1 , with respect to capital goods tariffs, τ
K
jt , at the sample mean is
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significant, it suggests that a similar 10 percentage point reduction in input tariffs can lead to a
6.11 percent increase in invested in foreign capital goods. The larger and statistically significant
impact of the change in capital goods tariffs is not surprising, since lowering capital goods tariffs
directly increases the demand for foreign capital goods by making them cheaper. The input tariffs,
on the other hand, work indirectly through the demand for imported intermediate inputs. When
intermediate inputs become cheaper as a result of a reduction in input tariffs, firms are able to
import more intermediate inputs, increasing the marginal profitability of capital. This suggested
mechanism conforms with the findings in Bas and Berthou (2013), who find that the reductions
in input tariffs increased the probability of importing capital goods for Indian firms. Lastly, we
evaluate the effect of output tariffs. The coefficient of 0.017 suggests that a 10 percentage point
reduction in output tariffs leads to a 4.72 percent decrease in investment in imported capital goods
by enhancing foreign competition and thereby reducing the marginal profitability of capital.
Turning to the other determinants of investment, lagged investment in foreign capital goods is
positive and statistically significant in all six specifications, demonstrating the serial correlation in
investment in imported capital goods. In terms of other firm-specific determinants, the coefficient
on lagged sales is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in all specifications, and the lagged
cash-flow is positive and significant at 10 percent in some of the cases. All specifications in Table
3.4 are supported by the tests of over-identifying restrictions, for which the Hansen test statistic
fails to reject the validity of the instrument sets. Moreover, the tests for serial correlation, which are
applied to the residuals in the first differenced equations (∆εijt), show that we can reject the null-
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, but cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no second
order serial correlation.22 The fact that the errors only have first order autocorrelation confirms the
validity of instruments dated t− 2 and t− 3.
calculated as -0.00034/0.036=0.00944.
22Assuming that the residuals, εijt, in equation (3.16) are i.i.d, we expect ∆εijt in the first-differenced equations to
have first order autocorrelation.
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3.6.2 Alternative Specifications
In this subsection, we consider alternative specifications for evaluating the impact of trade lib-
eralization on firm’s investment. We begin by augmenting the most general specification in column
(6) of Table 3.4 with the lagged value of the capital goods tariff measure. The theoretical invest-
ment equation we obtain (see equation (3.13)) suggests that both the current and the expected
tariffs on capital goods matter for inter-temporal investment decisions. Since the empirical spec-
ification in (3.16) corresponds to the theoretical investment equation lagged by one-period, both
the contemporaneous (dated t) and the lagged capital tariffs (dated t− 1) can affect foreign capital
investment decisions taken in period t. Column (1) of Table 3.5 presents the estimates obtained
from this augmented equation. The coefficient on the contemporaneous capital tariff rate of -0.048
is larger in magnitude compared to the baseline estimates in Table 3.4, and is significant at 10 per-
cent, implying that the firms choose to invest more in foreign capital goods in a given year if the
tariff rates on capital goods are lowered during that year. On the other hand, the coefficient on the
lagged capital tariff measure is positive, albeit not significant. This result suggests that firms facing
high tariff rates in the past year might have postponed purchasing foreign capital goods, and they
increase their investment in these goods in the following period when the tariffs were lowered.
Next, we investigate whether trade liberalization has impacted total investment and investment
in domestic capital goods similarly. Column (2) of Table 3.5 presents the results for estimating
equation (3.16) for total investment, and column (3) presents the results for investment in domestic
capital goods. We would expect the input and output tariffs to have the same effect on investment in
domestic capital goods and on foreign capital goods, since both tariff measures affect the marginal
profitability of capital (see equation (3.10)), which would matter for investment decisions in both
types of capital goods. However, how capital goods tariffs affect investment in domestic capital
goods is a priori ambiguous. If domestic and foreign capital goods are substitutes, a reduction in
capital goods tariffs should lower investment in domestic capital goods, as the reduction makes
foreign capital goods relatively cheaper. If they are complements, however, cheaper foreign capital
goods could also make the firm purchase more domestic capital goods.
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Table 3.5: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable– Investment rate: Foreign capital Total Domestic capital
Lagged foreign capital investment
(
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.089***
(0.009)
Lagged domestic capital investment IDijt
Kijt−1
-0.001 0.040*
(0.006) (0.024)
Lagged total investment ITijt
Kijt−1
0.055
(0.034)
Sales
(
Sijt
Kijt−1
)
0.003 0.023*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Lagged sales
(
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.001 0.014 0.012
(0.001) (0.012) (0.011)
Cash-flow
(
Cijt
Kijt−1
)
0.016 -0.134 -0.125
(0.019) (0.239) (0.207)
Lagged cash-flow
(
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.010 0.231 0.190
(0.006) (0.188) (0.157)
Output tariff
(
τOjt
100
)
0.014* 0.047 0.027
(0.008) (0.058) (0.062)
Input tariff
(
τIjt
100
)
-0.020 0.125 0.143
(0.015) (0.093) (0.090)
Capital goods tariff
(
τKjt
100
)
-0.048* -0.065 -0.053
(0.027) (0.118) (0.105)
Lagged capital goods tariff
(
τKjt−1
100
)
0.013
(0.025)
License -0.011* -0.034 -0.023
(0.006) (0.033) (0.029)
FDI -0.011 -0.006 -0.004
(0.010) (0.036) (0.032)
Number of observations 9,486 9,486 9,486
Number of firm 2,512 2,512 2,512
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.628 0.484 0.547
1st order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.00677 7.79e-08 7.38e-08
2nd order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.230 0.432 0.608
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While the sign of the coefficients on output and capital tariff measures in columns (2) and (3)
are similar to the estimates for investment in foreign capital goods in Table 3.4, they are not statis-
tically significant. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on input tariff measure is positive,
but not significant, in both specifications. It is not surprising that the results for total investment
resembles the results for investment in domestic capital goods, since on average investment in do-
mestic capital goods makes up 87 percent of total investment expenditures. These results imply
that an important benefit of trade liberalization accrue from enhanced ability of firms to invest in
foreign capital goods.
3.6.3 Mark-ups and Quality Ladder
In this subsection, we analyze the roles of market power, degree of competition, and the product
market’s scope for quality differentiation in mediating the impact of output tariffs on firm invest-
ment in foreign capital goods. The theoretical framework in Section 3.3 suggests that the effect
of output tariffs can be increasing in the size of the firm’s mark-up. A firm with higher market
power, i.e., with a higher mark-up, can be affected more adversely by lower output tariffs because
of the heightened import competition that erodes the marginal profitability of the firm. To check
for this, we include an interaction term between the average mark-up of the firm and the output
tariff measure in our main specification.
The results are presented in column (1) of Table 3.6.23 As expected, the interaction term be-
tween the average mark-up of the firm and the output tariff is positive with a coefficient of 0.190
and is highly significant. Unlike the interaction term, the coefficient on the output tariff measure
is negative (-.092) and significant. The coefficients jointly suggest that a 10 percentage point re-
duction in output tariffs at the sample mean (the mean mark-up in the sample is .618) leads to a
7.06 percent decrease in investment in imported capital goods. The positive interaction term im-
plies that a firm with a mark-up one standard deviation higher than the mean reduced investment
23Notes on Table 3.6: The first column augments the baseline model in column (6) of Table 3.4 with an interaction
term between the output tariff measure with the average mark-up of the firm,ψHi . Column (2) augments the baseline
model in column (6) of Table 3.4 with an interaction term between the output tariff measure with the quality ladder
index, the Herfindahl index measuring the competition at the 4-digit NIC industries, and the interaction term between
the Herfindahl index and the quality ladder measure. See Table Table 3.4 for additional notes.
70
in imported capital goods by 11.71 percent due to intensified foreign competition. In this extended
specification, the coefficient on capital-good tariffs increases in magnitude and is significant at the
1 percent level, and the coefficient on input tariffs is similar to the baseline specification.
In column (2) of Table 3.6, we analyze the role of product differentiation and quality upgrading
on investment in foreign capital goods. To that end, we augment the baseline specification with
an interaction term between the quality ladder index constructed by Khandelwal (2010) and output
tariffs (capturing the foreign competition), in addition to an interaction term between the quality
ladder index and a Herfindahl index of domestic competition at the four digit industry level.24 The
quality ladder index, which is time-invariant, measures the the scope for quality differentiation in
the industry. The adverse effects of both domestic and foreign competition on investment should
be lower in industries with “long” quality ladders, since it is more feasible for the firms to upgrade
the quality of their products in order not lose marginal profitability. As in the baseline specifica-
tion, the coefficient on output tariff is positive and significant, while its interaction with the quality
ladder index is negative and significant at 10 percent. The two coefficients jointly imply that a 10
percentage point reduction in the output tariffs leads to a 5.8 percent decline in the investment in
foreign capital goods given the quality ladder’s sample mean of 2.283. A similar 10 percentage
point reduction in output tariffs in an industry with a bigger scope for quality upgrading (one stan-
dard deviation above the mean) leads to a smaller decline in investment of 3.74 percent. When we
turn our attention to domestic competition, we find that enhanced competition increases investment
in foreign capital goods for industries at the mean of the quality ladder distribution. Specifically,
we find that a one standard deviation reduction in the Herfindahl index (corresponding to higher
levels of competition) leads to a 6.24 percent increase in investment in foreign capital goods. The
positive interaction shows that as the scope for quality differentiation increases, investment in for-
eign capital goods increases also for less competitive industries.
24 We construct the Herfindahl index as the sum of squared sales share of firms in each four digit NIC industry.
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Table 3.6: Mark-ups and Quality Ladder
Dependent Variable: IMijtKijt−1 (1) (2)
Lagged foreign capital investment
(
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.087*** 0.087***
(0.010) (0.010)
Sales
(
Sijt
Kijt−1
)
0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Lagged sales
(
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Cash-flow
(
Cijt
Kijt−1
)
0.017 0.015
(0.020) (0.020)
Lagged cash-flow
(
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.011 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
Output tariff
(
τOjt
100
)
-0.092** 0.078**
(0.044) (0.037)
Output tariff*mark-up
(
τOjt
100 ∗ ψHi
)
0.190***
(0.068)
Output tariff*Log quality ladder indicator -0.025*
(0.014)
Input tariff
(
τIjt
100
)
-0.022 -0.032*
(0.014) (0.018)
Capital goods tariff
(
τKjt
100
)
-0.039*** -0.037**
(0.014) (0.018)
Herfindahl index -0.150**
(0.069)
Herfindahl index*quality ladder indicator 0.059*
(0.032)
License -0.013* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.006)
FDI -0.013 -0.011
(0.009) (0.008)
Lagged domestic capital investment
(
IDijt−1
Kijt−2
)
-0.007* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
Number of observations 9,485 9,486
Number of firms 2,511 2,512
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.768 0.821
1st order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.007 0.007
2nd order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.211 0.216
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3.6.4 Importers of Intermediate Inputs and Exporters
In this subsection, we provide some sub-sample analysis with respect to the importing status
and exporting status of the firms. Equation (3.10) in Section 3.3 illustrates how a reduction in input
tariffs, τ It , can increase investment by lowering the cost of using imported inputs, and thereby rais-
ing the marginal profitability of capital. Hence, a firm requiring the use of imported inputs should
benefit more from a reduction in input tariffs. Moreover, firms that use imported intermediate in-
puts that are complements to imported capital goods in the production process might invest more
when capital becomes cheaper as a result of lower capital goods tariffs. To test whether importing
intermediate goods matters for foreign capital investment decisions, we estimate the comprehen-
sive specification in column (6) of Table 3.4 on firms that are importers of intermediate inputs, and
exclude non-importers from the sample. We classify a firm as an importer of foreign intermediate
inputs if it has imported intermediate inputs for at least two years between 1989-1997. This lowers
the number of firms in the sample from 2,512 to 1,911. The results are reported in the first column
of Table 3.7. The coefficient on output tariffs remain similar to the baseline estimates, and is sig-
nificant at the 5 level while the coefficent on capital goods tariff increases slightly in magnitude to
-0.037 and is significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the coefficient on input tariffs increases
in magnitude, and becomes significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate of -0.030 suggests that
a 10 percentage point reduction in input tariffs increases investment in foreign capital by 7.32 per-
cent for firms that import intermediate inputs. These results are consistent with the findings in Bas
and Berthou (2013), who find that the reduction in input tariffs between 1999-2006 in India (12
percentage points) led to an increase in the probability of importing capital goods of 2.6 percent
for the average firm, and almost 4 percent for the average firm importing intermediate goods.
Next, we consider the exporting status of the firms. Firms that export can have higher invest-
ment profiles, since such firms are typically more productive and are larger in size, and therefore
might respond more to reductions in tariffs. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.7 present the results
from estimating our main specification for exporters and non-exporters separately. We categorize
a firm as an exporter if the firm exported for at least two years between 1990-1997. The estimates
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Table 3.7: Intermediate good importers and Exporting
Dependent Variable: IMijtKijt−1 (1) (2) (3)
Importers only Exporters Non-exporters
Lagged foreign capital investment
(
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.087*** 0.089*** 0.074***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Sales
(
Sijt
Kijt−1
)
0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged sales
(
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Cash-flow
(
Cijt
Kijt−1
)
0.015 0.009 0.010
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014)
Lagged cash-flow
(
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
)
0.012 0.016 0.002
(0.010) (0.016) (0.004)
Output tariff
(
τOjt
100
)
0.017** 0.020 0.012
(0.007) (0.015) (0.098)
Input tariff
(
τIjt
100
)
-0.030** -0.038** 0.013
(0.013) (0.018) (0.046)
Capital goods tariff
(
τKjt
100
)
-0.037*** -0.034* -0.036
(0.012) (0.020) (0.151)
License -0.010** -0.012* -0.017
(0.004) (0.007) (0.052)
FDI -0.003 -0.012 -0.011
(0.005) (0.013) (0.025)
Lagged domestic capital investment
(
IDijt−1
Kijt−2
)
-0.007* -0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Number of observations 8,016 7,014 2,472
Number of firms 1,911 1,607 905
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.641 0.376 0.817
1st order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.00767 0.0142 0.0359
2nd order serial correlation test (p-value) 0.214 0.284 0.327
Notes: The first column reports the estimates obtained using a sample of firms that export for at least for two years between 1989-1997. Column
(2) reports the estimates obtained using a sample of firms that export for at least for two years during the sample period. Column (3) reports the
estimates obtained using a sample of firms that do not export. See Table Table 3.4 for additional notes.
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of both the input and capital tariffs are negative for the exporters, and they are significant at the 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively. In column (2), the coefficient on the capital tariff measure is
the same size as the one obtained for the full sample (-0.034, see column (6) of Table 3.4), where
as the coefficient on the input tariff measure is much larger at -0.038. These estimates suggest that
a 10 percentage point reduction in tariffs on capital goods increases investment in foreign capital
goods by 8.5 percent and a 10 percentage point reduction in tariffs on inputs, increases investment
in foreign capital goods by 9.5 percent.25 The estimate of the effect of output tariffs is also similar
in size to the one obtained using the full sample; however, it is not statistically significant. We
present the results for non-exporters in column (3). Unlike the impacts we uncover for exporters,
we do not find statistically significant effects of lower tariffs on investment in foreign capital goods
for non-exporters.
3.6.5 Heterogeneity in the Impact of Lower Tariffs
In this subsection, we analyze the heterogeneity in the impact of lower tariffs on investment in
imported capital goods. Building on the work of Melitz (2003a), theoretical and empirical studies
such as Bustos (2011a) and Bas and Berthou (2013) have shown that faced with lower tariffs,
firms will have an incentive to upgrade technology given the expanded export opportunities or the
cheaper inputs. Both studies suggest that this incentive is not the same for all firms. It varies with
productivity and the impact of changes in tariffs is greater for firms in the middle-range of the
productivity distribution. Similar patterns are likely to exist in India. For example, as tariffs on
capital goods or intermediate inputs decline, firms in the middle of the productivity distribution are
most likely to experience the largest incentive to invest due to the lower prices of imported capital
goods and intermediate inputs. Lower tariffs can spur investment for these firms, which were likely
on the margin in investing in imported or domestic capital goods. On the other hand, the incentive
of cheaper capital goods and imported intermediate goods might not be large enough for the least
efficient firms, as for these firms, the marginal profitability of capital would be quite low before
and after the fall in tariffs. Similarly, the most productive establishments might not increase their
25The mean foreign capital goods investment rate is higher for exporters at 0.040, compared to the 0.0361 for the
full sample.
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investments by much because they would have likely already achieved a high investment rate based
on the high expected level of sales prior to trade liberalization.
To test empirically for heterogeneity in the impact of India’s trade liberalization on firm-level
investment, we divide all firms into 4 groups - the four quartiles of productivity distribution. We
then estimate the following expanded version of our baseline specification (3.16):
IMijt
Kijt−1
= α1
IMijt−1
Kijt−2
+ α2
Sijt
Kijt−1
+ α3
Sijt−1
Kijt−2
+ α4
Cijt
Kijt−1
+ α5
Cijt−1
Kijt−2
+
+
4∑
r=1
γrτK (τ
K
jt ×Qrij) +
4∑
r=1
γrτI (τ
I
jt ×Qrij) +
4∑
r=1
γrτO(τ
O
jt ×Qrij) + υi + ηt + εijt (3.17)
where r indexes the four quartiles of the productivity distribution and Qij is the indicator variable
equal to one when firm i belongs to quartile r. We classify firms into the four quartiles using two
alternate measures of productivity. The first measure we use is total factor productivity (TFP). We
estimate the Cobb Douglas production function using a control function approach in the spirit of
Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2015) using material
inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity. We use the mean TFP levels of the firms to classify
them into the four quartiles and present the estimates in column (1) of Table 3.8. The second
measure we use is firm-size based on mean sales to classify firms into the four quartiles, we present
the estimates in column (2) of Table 3.8.
In general, the results are consistent with expectations and imply that the impact of lower
capital goods tariffs is the highest for the middle quartiles. The impact of the reduction of capital
goods tariffs on investment in imported capital goods is largest for firms in the third quartile. The
magnitudes of the estimates at -.075 (column 1) and -0.044 (column 2), are larger than the average
impact of -0.034 that we estimated for all firms in our baseline specification (3.16) (see Table
3.4). The estimates of the capital goods tariffs is significant at the 5 percent level under both
the alternate ways of classifying firms into the four quartiles. The effects of lower input tariffs and
output tariffs are less precisely estimated. The coefficients on output tariffs suggest that the smaller
and less productive firms (in the first and second quartiles) were largely unaffected by foreign
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity of the impacts across size groups
Dependent Variable: IMijt
Kijt−1
(1) (2)
Productivity quartiles Sales quartiles
Capital goods tariff– First quartile -0.033 -0.072
(0.024) (0.048)
Capital goods tariff– Second quartile -0.025 -0.026
(0.029) (0.023)
Capital goods tariff– Third quartile -0.075** -0.044**
(0.029) (0.022)
Capital goods tariff– Fourth quartile -0.017 -0.032
(0.026) (0.021)
Input tariff– First quartile 0.005 0.017
(0.028) (0.050)
Input tariff– Second quartile -0.019 -0.025
(0.031) (0.022)
Input tariff– Third quartile -0.016 0.003
(0.031) (0.022)
Input tariff– Fourth quartile -0.047 -0.030
(0.030) (0.024)
Output tariff– First quartile -0.006 0.005
(0.013) (0.108)
Output tariff– Second quartile 0.019 0.001
(0.018) (0.011)
Output tariff– Third quartile 0.055* 0.004
(0.031) (0.023)
Output tariff– Fourth quartile 0.022 0.030*
(0.018) (0.016)
Notes: The reported coefficients are the interaction terms between the corresponding tariff measure and the dummy for the four quartiles. The firms
are classified into four quartiles based on average total factor productivity (column 1) or average size measured by sales (column 2).
77
competition while the larger and more productive firms faced more stiff foreign competition and
lowered investment. These results show that not all firms responded to changes in tariffs in a
similar way and this highlights the importance of controlling for heterogeneity in uncovering the
impact of trade liberalization on investment in foreign capital goods.
3.6.6 Overall Impact of the Trade Liberalization on the Investment in Foreign Capital Goods in
India’s Manufacturing Sector
Finally, in this subsection, we evaluate the overall impact of India’s trade liberalization between
1990 and 1997 on the investment rate in foreign capital goods
(
IMijt
Kijt−1
)
in the manufacturing sector.
We also separate and compare the respective contributions of the three major trade barriers- tariffs
on capital goods, intermediate inputs and final output- which declined substantially as part of the
trade liberalization process. In 1990, the average output, intermediate input, and capital goods
tariffs were 95, 85, and 94 percent, respectively. By the end of our sample period in 1997, the three
average tariff rates had dropped to 39, 34, and 33 percent, respectively.
Given the overall decrease in these trade barriers, our baseline estimates in column (6) of
Table 3.4 imply that the 61-percentage-point decline in capital goods tariffs led to a 57.58 percent
increase in the average investment in foreign capital goods. On the other hand, the 56-percentage-
point decline in output tariffs led to a 26.43 percent decline in the average investment in foreign
capital goods. Combining these two opposing effects, we get a net positive effect of 31.15 percent
increase in the average investment in foreign capital. Even though it is statistically insignificant, if
we add the economically significant impact of the 51-percentage-point decline in the intermediate
input tariffs, which resulted in a 31.16 percent increase in investment, we find a net increase of
62.31 percent. Hence, given the average investment rate
(
IM
K
)
of 0.036 over the sample period, our
results imply that the trade liberalization increased the investment rate to 0.058.
Not surprisingly, the net impact of the trade liberalization on the investment rate differs across
the manufacturing industries, driven by the differences in the decline in three tariff measures, and
the average foreign capital investment rate in each of the industries. In Table 3.9, we report the
initial and the final average tariff rates for the two-digit NIC-industries in our sample, along with
the change in the investment in foreign capital goods caused by the reduction in each tariff measure.
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The last column presents the combined effect of the reductions in output, input, and capital goods
measures. While the net impact is positive for all of the industries, there is substantial variation
in the net gains. Among the industries that witnessed the largest net increase in their investment
in foreign capital goods are “Coke and Petroleum Products” (167 percent increase), “Beverages”
(159 percent increase), and “Food Products” (156 percent increase). These are also the industries
that benefitted most from the reduction in capital goods tariffs. On the other hand, the net increase
in the foreign capital investment in the “Motor Vehicles and Trailers” (13 percent), “Furniture”
(10 percent), and “Recorded Media” (4 percent) industries relatively small, despite the substantial
reduction in industries, due to the fact that these industries had relatively large foreign capital
investment rates to begin with.
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3.7 Conclusion
Using firm-level data from the Indian manufacturing sector, we evaluate the impact of lower
capital tariffs, as well as input and output tariffs, on firms’ investment in foreign capital goods.
Our study improves upon previous work along two dimensions. First, it distinguishes investment
in imported capital goods from other investment, and shows that trade liberalization contributed to
capital accumulation through its impact on investment in foreign capital good, rather than domestic
investment. Second, employing input-output tables, we construct capital goods tariffs that are
distinct from tariffs on intermediate inputs and final consumption goods. This allows us to estimate
the price elasticity of investment in foreign capital goods.
Theory suggests three mechanisms through which trade liberalization can affect investment
in foreign capital goods. Lower capital goods tariffs has a direct positive effect of investment
decisions, as they lower the price of foreign capital goods. Lower input tariffs increases firm’s
profitability, and therefore investment as it improves access to cheaper inputs, while lower output
tariffs bring about more intense import competition, which results in lower profits and investment.
The estimates in our analysis conform to these predictions. Employing data that cover a period
of broad trade liberalization in India in the 1990s, we find that a 10 percentage point decrease
in the capital goods tariffs led to a 9.44 percent increase in the average firms investment rate in
foreign capital goods. A similar 10 percentage point reduction in input tariffs led to a 6.11 percent
increase in investment in foreign capital. Also as predicted by theory, we find that the reductions
in output tariffs affect investment adversely. When we combine the effects of the three types of
tariffs, we find that the trade liberalization in India resulted in a net increase of 62.31 percent in the
manufacturing sector investment rate over the course of our 7 year sample period (1990-1997).
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR EXPORTS AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ROLE OF IMPORTED INPUTS
AND INVESTMENT IN R & D
A.1 Export-Import and Export-R & D Complementarity: A Framework
I present a simple framework to motivate the export-import and export-investment in R & D
complementarities that are observed in the data.
A.1.1 Variable Profits
The firm operates in monopolistically competitive markets and produces a single product,
which it can sell in the domestic market or abroad. This demand structure is commonly used
in models of international trade (see Melitz (2003b)). The demand functions of the firm in the
domestic (QDit ) and export (Q
X
it ) markets are given by
QDit = Q
ID
t
(
PDit
P IDt
)−σ
= ΦDt (P
D
it )
−σ (A.1)
QXit = Q
IX
t
(
PXit
P IXt
)−σ
= ΦXt (P
X
it )
−σ (A.2)
PDit and P
X
it are prices of the firm in the domestic and export markets, Q
ID
t , Q
IX
t , P
ID
t and P
IX
t
are the industry output and price indices in the two markets, σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of
demand, ΦDt and Φ
X
t represent industry aggregates.
A firm that sells only in the domestic market (dx = 0) sets optimal price pit = σσ−1MCit where
MR = MC. If a firm is an exporter (dx = 1), it maximizes its joint profits in the two markets and
sets price so that MRD = MRX = MC i.e, marginal revenues are equal in the two markets and
equal the marginal cost of production. The optimal variable profits piit in period t is given by:
piit(d
x = 0) =
λ
σ
[
ΦDt
(
σ
σ − 1
)(1−λ)αv ( eωitKαkit
βwtαlutαePxit
αx
)σ−1] 1λ
(A.3)
piit(d
x = 1) =
λ
σ
[
(1 + Φt)Φ
D
t
(
σ
σ − 1
)(1−λ)αv ( eωitKαkit
βwtαlutαePxit
αx
)σ−1] 1λ
(A.4)
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where piit, the optimal variable profits (gross), depends on whether the firm sells only in the do-
mestic market (dx = 0) or whether it is an exporter and sells in both domestic and export markets
(dx = 1). Here, Φt =
ΦXt
ΦDt
, β = α−αll α
−αe
e α
−αx
x , αv = αl+αe+αx and λ = 1+(1−αv)(σ−1) ≥ 1.
In the specific case of constant marginal cost where αv = 1, λ will take the value 1.
A.1.2 Import and R & D Decision
The firm’s environment is represented by the vector Ψit = (dxi , Ki, wt, ut, Pdt, p
f
t , f
n
i ,Φ
D
t ,Φt).
Here fni is the fixed cost of importing each foreign variety. I assume that the firm takes its envi-
ronment as given and chooses the number of imported varieties and whether to invest in R & D or
not. Since the aim is to understand why and how firms improve productivity after they enter into
export markets, I abstract from modeling the firm’s decision to export or invest in physical capital
stock. There is a well established literature which models more productive firms self selecting into
export markets since they find it worth while to pay the entry and fixed costs of exporting for a
higher per period variable profit from exporting. For example, see Melitz (2003b). There is also a
long literature on investment in capital stock, where under varying assumptions about the nature of
adjustment costs, firms make investment decisions where they equate the marginal cost of capital
adjustment to the expected marginal gains from investment.
Since I am interested in how productivity evolves differently for an exporter versus a non ex-
porter and how this is determined by the import and R & D behavior of the firm, I focus on these two
decisions. I emphasize that these are simplifying assumptions which do not impact the empirical
estimation since I do not structurally model selection into export markets, R & D status, investment
in physical capital or number of varieties imported. In the empirical estimation, I recognize that
these are endogenous variables while I estimate productivity. I then use matching methods (where
I match on pre-entry productivity levels, capital stock as well as a host of other factors which are
recognized to determine export entry) to compare productivity evolution for export entrants versus
non exporters. The purpose of this basic framework is to develop the intuition for why incentives
for investing in R & D and importing intermediate inputs vary by export status. Given this caveat,
I proceed.
The firm pays a fixed cost of importing each foreign variety of the intermediate input (fni ) and
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chooses the number of varieties (nit) to maximize net profits.
Π(ωit,Ψit) = Maxnit piit(ωit, d
x
i , Ki, wt, ut, Pdt, p
f
t ,Φ
D
t ,Φt, nit)− nitfni (A.5)
The optimal number of varieties is denoted by n∗(ωit,Ψit). The firm finds it optimal to import an
additional variety as long as the increase in variable profits from the additional variety is larger
than fni .
Since R & D in year t impacts productivity in t + 1, the decision to invest in R & D is a
dynamic problem for the firm. Investment in R & D involves a per-period fixed cost, fki . The
Bellman equation is given by:
V (ωit; Ψit) = Π(ωit; Ψit)+Maxdkit
{
δE[V (ωit+1|ωit, dkit = 1; Ψit)− fki ], δE[V (ωit+1|ωit, dkit = 0; Ψit)]
}
(A.6)
I assume that the firm’s environment Ψit = (dxi , Ki, wt, ut, Pdt, p
f
t , f
n
i ,Φ
D
t ,Φt) is constant over
time (Ψit = Ψit+1) and firms have perfect foresight about it. This is a simplifying assumption to
isolate the impact of R & D. Investment in R & D in t − 1 impacts ωit in t. The firm invests in R
& D in t if
E[V (ωit+1|ωit, dkit = 1; Ψit)]− fki > E[V (ωit+1|ωit, dkit = 0; Ψit)] (A.7)
A.1.3 Comparative Statics by Export Status
From (A.3) and (A.4), the change in variable profits (gross) from importing an additional vari-
ety is given by:
piit(., nit)− piit(., nit−1) = λ
σ
[
(1 + Φtd
x
i )Φ
D
t
(
σ
σ − 1
)(1−λ)αv ( eωitKαkit
βwtαlutαe
)σ−1] 1λ
∆it (A.8)
where dxi = 0, 1 is an indicator variable for export status and
∆it =
[(
1
Px(Pdt, p
f
t , nit)
)σ−1
λ
−
(
1
Px(Pdt, p
f
t , nit − 1)
)σ−1
λ
]
(A.9)
84
From (2.15) and (A.9) and since σ−1
λ
> 0, ∆it > 0. Thus, the marginal change in profit from
buying an additional imported variety is positive i.e., piit(., nit) − piit(., nit−1) > 0. Furthermore,
since 1 + Φt > 1 and λ ≥ 1), it follows that
piit(., nit)− piit(., nit−1)|dxi = 1 > piit(., nit)− piit(., nit−1)|dxi = 0 (A.10)
The marginal increase in variable profits from importing an additional variety of the intermediate
input is higher for an exporter compared to a non exporter, everything else being equal. It follows
that the optimal number of imported varieties is non decreasing in export status i.e.,
n∗(ωit,Ψit|dxi = 1) ≥ n∗(ωit,Ψit|dxi = 0) (A.11)
Next, I move to investment in R & D. First, from (A.3) and (A.4), it is straightforward to see
that variable profits are increasing in ωit for both exporters and non exporters, i.e.,
∂piit(.)
∂ωit
=
σ − 1
λ
piit(.) > 0 (A.12)
Furthermore, since 1+Φt > 1 and σ−1λ > 0, it follows from (A.3), (A.4) and (A.12) that everything
else being equal, this increase is greater for exporters as compared to non exporters.
∂piit(.)
∂ωit
|dxi = 1 >
∂piit(.)
∂ωit
|dxi = 0 (A.13)
From (2.7) and (A.13),
[E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 1,Ψit)−E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 0,Ψit)]|dxi = 1 >
[E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 1,Ψit)− E(piit+1|ωit, dki = 0,Ψit)]|dxi = 0
(A.14)
Investment in R & D in t increases expected variable profits of t + 1 more for an exporter
as compared to a non exporter. Thus, other things being equal, an exporter will have a higher
probability of doing R & D.
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A.2 Imports in the Empirical Production Function
The nested Cobb Douglas- CES structure of the firm’s production function as specified in
(2.1) and (2.2) allows for the sequential solving of the firm’s problem. The firm’s demand for the
domestic intermediate input bundle Xdit and the imported intermediate input bundle Xfit is given
by solving
Min PdtXdit + PfitXfit (A.15)
s.t [Xρdit +X
ρ
fit]
1
ρ ≥ Xit
The optimal demand functions for the domestic and imported intermediate input bundles are given
by
Xdit =
[
Pdt
Pxit
] 1
ρ−1
Xit (A.16)
Xfit =
[
Pfit
Pxit
] 1
ρ−1
Xit (A.17)
Here the demand for the intermediate input bundle Xit is the input demand function for the Cobb
Douglas technology specified in (2.1)
Xit =
αx
Pxit
[
Qit
eωitKαkit
] 1
αl+αe+αx
[
wt
αl
] αl
αl+αe+αx
[
pet
αe
] αe
αl+αe+αx
[
Pxit
αx
] αx
αl+αe+αx
(A.18)
Here, wt is the price of labor inputs, pet is the price of energy inputs and Pxit is the price of the
intermediate input bundle of firm i in period t.
Pxit = [P
ρ
ρ−1
dt + P
ρ
ρ−1
fit ]
ρ−1
ρ (A.19)
The total expenditure on intermediate inputs is Mit and is given by Mit = PitXit where Xit
is the optimal demand for intermediate inputs. The total expenditure on domestic intermediate
inputs is Mdit and is given by Mdit = PdtXdit where Xdit is the optimal demand for the domestic
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intermediate input bundle. From (2.2), (A.16), (A.17), and (A.19),
Mit
Mdit
=
[
Pxit
Pdt
] ρ
ρ−1
(A.20)
Rearranging the terms of (A.20) gives (2.30) in subsection 2.4.1 in the text.
A.2.1 Firm Price Deflators
Firm specific price deflators are calculated using firm level product data. Using data on product
level total revenue and quantity of each product, I get the price of each product of a firm. I then
construct firm price deflators similar to Eslava et al. (2004) and Eslava et al. (2010). The growth in
prices of firm i is given by the weighted average of the growth in prices of all products of the firm
where the weights are given by the share of the product revenues in total revenue of the firm.
∆Pit =
H∑
h=1
shit∆ln(Phit) (A.21)
where
∆ln(Phit) = ln(Phit)− ln(Phit−1) (A.22)
and
shit =
shit + shit−1
2
(A.23)
where shit is the share of product h in revenue of firm i in period t. The industry base price was
set at 100 for 1989. Industry price indices for each year was calculated by recursively adding the
weighted growth in prices of all firms with weights given by firm share in total industry share in
that year. The firm’s initial price was set at the industry average at the particular year it was first
observed similar to Eslava et al. (2004) and subsequently,
∆Pit = Pit−1 + ∆ln(Pit−1) (A.24)
Since price growth had large outliers (both at the upper and lower tails), I winsorized price changes
at the 3rd and 97th percentile by year.
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A.3 Correlation Matrix and Additional Figures
Table A.1: Correlation of Input Variables
Labor Capital Material Inputs Import Intensity Energy
Labor 1
Capital 0.686 1
Material Inputs 0.6916 0.6802 1
Import Intensity 0.1773 0.1966 0.1898 1
Energy 0.7146 0.7314 0.6993 0.126 1
Notes: Variables are all natural logarithms of inputs used in the right hand side of the production function. All correlations are significant at the
one percent level.
Figure A.1: Distribution of ω
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Figure A.2: Distribution of ω by year
A.3.1 Tables: Alternate Matching
Table A.2: Productivity Growth over Time from Export Entry: Matching Results
Total Productivity Imports R & D
α̂χχit + ω̂it α̂χχit ω̂it
t+1 0.050* 0.002 0.048*
(0.027) (0.004) (0.027)
t+2 0.063** 0.007 0.056*
(0.028) (0.005) (0.029)
t+3 0.051 0.012*** 0.039
(0.035) (0.004) (0.034)
t+4 0.070** 0.017*** 0.053
(0.035) (0.005) (0.033)
t+5 0.081** 0.018*** 0.063*
(0.039) (0.005) (0.036)
t+6 0.094** 0.018*** 0.076*
(0.041) (0.005) (0.040)
Notes: Nearest Neighbor matching using five neighbors with replacement. The number of treated is 348. Block Bootstrap Standard errors given in
parentheses (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: Productivity Growth from Export Entry (All export entrants): Matching Results
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Total Productivity 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.107*** 0.094***
(α̂χχit + ω̂it) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036)
Imports 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(α̂χχit) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
R & D 0.055** 0.064*** 0.070** 0.069** 0.092*** 0.080**
(ω̂it) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038)
Notes: Nearest Neighbor matching using five neighbors with replacement. The number of treated varies by year (544 to 364). Block Bootstrap
Standard errors given in parentheses (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN CAPITAL
GOODS (CO-AUTHORED WITH IVAN T. KANDILOV AND ASLI LEBLEBICIOG˘LU)
B.1 Euler Equation
F.O.C w.r.t Iit yields
1 +
∂G (Kit−1, Iit)
∂Iit
= βEt
[
∂Vit+1(kit)
∂Kit
∂Kit
∂Iit
]
(B.1)
F.O.C using Vit+1(Kit) w.r.t Kit yields
∂Vit+1(kit)
∂Kit
=
∂Πit+1
∂Kit
− ∂G (Kit, Iit+1)
∂Kit
+ βEt
[
∂Vit+2(kit+1)
∂Kit+1
∂Kit+1
∂Kit
]
(B.2)
Substituting into equation (B.1) using
∂Vit+1(kit)
∂Kit
=
∂Πit+1
∂Kit
− ∂G (Kit, Iit+1)
∂Kit
+ (1− δ)
[
1 +
∂G (Kit, Iit+1)
∂Iit+1
]
(B.3)
we get equation (3.7) in the text.
B.2 Demand for Imported Capital Goods
The firm’s demand for domestic and imported capital goods is given by solving
Min PDtIDit + τ
K
t PMtIMit (B.4)
subject to [
(1− µi) 1ω I
ω−1
ω
Dit + µ
1
ω
i I
ω−1
ω
Mit
] ω
ω−1 ≥ Iit
The demand for imported capital goods is given by:
IMit = µi(τ
K
t PMt)
−ωIit
[
(1− µi)P 1−ωDt + µi(τKt PMt)1−ω
] ω
1−ω (B.5)
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The price of the investment basket is a CES aggregator of domestic and imported capital goods:
PIit =
[
(1− µi)P 1−ωDt + µi(τKt PMt)1−ω
] 1
1−ω (B.6)
Normalizing the price of the investment basket of the firm to 1 and using equation (B.5) yields
equation (3.9) in the text.
B.3 The Marginal Profitability of Capital
Optimal behavior by the firm requires that the marginal cost of hiring domestic and foreign
variable inputs equals their marginal revenue productivities.
(
θ − 1
θ
)
pit
∂F
∂Lit
= wt (B.7)
(
θ − 1
θ
)
pit
∂F
∂L∗it
= τ It w
∗
t (B.8)
Since F (.) is homogenous of degree 1, Euler’s theorem implies that
∂F
∂Kit−1
Kit−1 +
∂F
∂Lit
Lit +
∂F
∂L∗it
L∗it = xit (B.9)
We differentiate equation (3.4) with respect to Kit−1 to write the marginal profitability of capital
as
∂Πit
∂Kit−1
=
(
θ − 1
θ
)
pit
∂F
∂Kit−1
(B.10)
From equation (B.7), equation (B.8), equation (3.4), and equation (B.9) we get:
Πit
Kit−1
=
pitxit
Kit−1
+
(
θ − 1
θ
)
pit
∂F
∂Kit−1
−
(
θ − 1
θ
)
pitxit
Kit−1
(B.11)
We substitute for ∂F
∂Kit−1
from equation (B.11) into equation (B.10) and obtain equation (3.10) in
the text.
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B.4 Euler Equation, Taylor Expansion and Structural Parameters
We substitute the partial derivatives of the adjustment cost function in equation (3.12) into
equation (3.7):
(
1− γ I¯
K
)
+ γ
Iit
Kit−1
= βEt
[
∂Πit+1
∂Kit
+
γ
2
(
Iit+1
Kit
)2
(B.12)
+ (1− δ)γ Iit+1
Kit
+ (1− δ)
(
1− γ I¯
K
)
− γ
2
(
I¯
K
)2 ]
To obtain the fully-parameterized non-linear investment equation for foregin capital goods, we
substitute the marginal profitability of capital in equation (3.10), and the demand for imported
capital goods in equation (3.9) into the Euler equation in equation (B.12).
θ1
(
τKt PMt
)ω IMit
Kit−1
+ θ2 = βEt
[
xit+1pit+1
ψKit
− wt+1Lit+1
Kit
− τ
I
t+1w
∗
t+1L
∗
it+1
Kit
(B.13)
+θ3
(
τKt+1PMt+1
)2ω (IMit+1
Kit
)2
+ θ4
(
τKt+1PMt+1
)ω IMit+1
Kit
+ θ5
]
where θ1 = γµ
θ2 = 1− γµ
(
τKPM
)ω IM
K
θ3 =
γ
2µ2
θ4 = (1− δ) γµ
θ5 = (1− δ)
[
1− γ
µ
(
τKPM
)ω IM
K
]
− γ
2µ2
(
τKPM
)2ω ( IM
K
)2
First we take a first-order Taylor approximation of the non-linear equation above around the
steady state values of the variables. Second we define total sales as Sit=xit+1pit+1; total costs as
Zit+1 = wt+1Lit+1; and the cost of imported inputs as Z∗it+1 = τ
I
t+1w
∗
t+1L
∗
it+1. Rewriting the sales
and the cost variables in terms of Sit, Zit+1 and Z∗it+1, we obtain equation (3.13) in the text:
IMit
Kit−1
= Et
[
φ0 + φ1
IMit+1
Kit
+ φ2
Sit+1
Kit
− φ3Zit+1
Kit
− φ4Z
∗
it+1
Kit
+ φ5
(
τKt+1PMt+1
)− φ6 (τKt PMt)]
The expressions for the coefficients in terms of the structural parameters and the steady-state
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values of the variables are:
φ0 =
S
ψ
− Z − Z∗ + (1− δ)− 1
β
φ1 =
(τKPM)
ω
µ
IM
K
+ (1− δ)
φ2 =
µ
γψ
(
τKPM
)−ω
φ3 = φ4 =
µ
γ
(
τKPM
)−ω
φ5 =
ω
µ
(
IM
K
)2 (
τKPM
)ω−1
+ (1− δ)ω IM
K
(
τKPM
)−1
φ6 =
ω
IM
K
τKPM
.
B.5 Input Tariffs
Matrix 1 of the Input-Output Transaction Table (1993-94) is the Absorption matrix which gives
for each Industry k,
Intermediate Inputs at Factor cost + Capital Inputs at Factor cost + Services Inputs + Net
Indirect Taxes + Value Added = Gross Value of Output
Matrix 3 of the Input - Output Transaction Table (1993-94) gives the above in terms of coef-
ficients or share in output by dividing by Gross value of output. We use the information directly
from the coefficient matrix i.e., Matrix 3
Share of Intermediate inputs + Share of Capital Inputs + Share of Service Inputs + Share of
Net Indirect Taxes + Share of Value Added = 1
For each industry k,∑
s c
Intermediate
sk +
∑
s c
Capital
sk +
∑
s c
Services
sk + Share of Net Indirect Taxes + Share of Value Added
= 1
Intermediate Inputs constitute sectors: s = 1− 76 , 85− 86 and 97− 98
Capital Inputs constitute sectors: s = 77− 84 and 87− 96
Service Inputs constitute sectors: s = 99− 115
Since we don’t have tariffs on services and are interested in constructing separate tariffs on
intermediate inputs and capital inputs we rescale the coefficients such that for each industry k,
wIntermediatesk =
cIntermediatesk∑
s c
Intermediate
sk
for each s and
∑
sw
Intermediate
sk = 1
wCapitalsk =
cCapitalsk∑
s c
Capital
sk
for each s and
∑
sw
Capital
sk = 1
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The intermediate input and capital input tariffs for each industry k are then calculated as:
τ Intermediatekt =
∑
s
wIntermediatesk τst
where wIntermediatesk is the weight of the intermediate input industry s in output of industry k and
τst is the tariff of industry s in time t.
τCapitalkt =
∑
s
wCapitalsk τst
where wCapitalsk is the weight of the Capital input industry s in output of industry k and τst is the
tariff of industry s in time t
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